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This Article considers the role of tax lawyers in the corporate tax shelter
controversy. In the mid-1990s, a large market emerged in abusive tax shelters,
which cost the Treasury tens of billions of dollars in lost tax revenue a year.
Although individual tax lawyers were deeply involved in abusive tax shelters,
the organized tax bar supported law reforms intended to rein in the tax shelter
market. The bar's initiatives included due diligence obligations for opinion
letters issued in connection with tax shelters and other proposals intended to
strengthen practice standards. The tax bar's positions in the tax shelter debate
cannot be adequately explained by conventional accounts of the organized bar,
which assume that bar groups act to further lawyers' or clients' economic
interests or to improve the reputation of the bar. Nor, however, should the
bar's positions be taken as pure expressions of public-mindedness. A more
nuanced conception of professionalism is required to account for the bar's
initiatives. This Article argues that the bar's positions reflect a specific
professional ideology of tax practice in which tax lawyers, by virtue of their
expertise, serve as gatekeepers for the tax system. While not conferring
immediate economic benefits to tax lawyers, the bar's reforms further tax
lawyers' long-term reputational and other interests, even as they serve to bind
lawyers to higher practice standards and protect the integrity of the tax system.
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Introduction: The Puzzles of Professionalism
During the financial boom of the 1990s, a substantial market emerged in
abusive tax shelters. These shelters, which typically involved complex
financing devices, esoteric legal instruments, and multiple layers of
corporations, partnerships and trusts, took advantage of the complexity of the
Internal Revenue Code to create enormous paper losses that corporations could
use to offset their taxable income.' Elite professionals played a prominent role
in the emergence of this market. Large accounting firms, investment banks, and
corporate law firms all became involved, designing and marketing hundreds of
highly lucrative shelters that are estimated to have cost the federal government
tens of billions in lost tax revenue dollars.
2
1 See, e.g., Joseph Bankman, The New Market for Tax Shelters, 83 TAX NOTES 1775 (1999).
The line between abusive tax shelters and legitimate transactions is often murky. See id at 1782.
Whether a particular tax shelter is considered abusive is frequently a contested question that depends on
the theory of tax law interpretation espoused. Typically, abusive shelters are transactions whose form
falls within the language of the Code but that bestow tax benefits not intended by Congress. See infra
Section I.A.
2 Janet Novak and Laura Saunders first broke the corporate tax shelter story in a 1998 cover
article in Forbes that described various shelters being marketed by Deloitte & Touche and other
accounting firms. See Janet Novak & Laura Saunders, The Hustling of X Rated Tax Shelters, FORBES,
Dec. 14, 1998, at 198; see also Susan Beck, Gimme Shelter, AM. LAW., Nov. 1999, at 105; Paul
Braverman, Helter Shelter, AM. LAW., Dec. 2003, at 65; David Kay Johnston, Tax Magicians: Sham
Shelters for Business Flourish as Scrutiny Fades, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2000, at Al; Floyd Norris, The
Rise of Phony Corporate Tax Shelters, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 1999, at A22; Michael M. Philips, Taking
Shelter: As Congress Ponders New Tax Breaks, Firms Already Find Plenty, WALL ST. J., Aug. 4, 1999,
at Al. Many tax officials and scholars believe that abusive shelters are the most serious threat facing the
tax system today. See, e.g., Bankman, supra note 1; Christopher Bergin, Corporate Shelters are Serious
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Tax lawyers, notably, participated in every aspect of the shelter industry.
Sought after for their technical expertise, well-established practitioners left
their corporate firms to join large accounting firms in order to earn higher
incomes designing and marketing shelters. 3 Tax lawyers who remained at
traditional firms, while often avoiding direct involvement in developing
shelters, proved eager to provide legal opinions that blessed questionable tax
schemes, earning a share of the enormous sums in play.
4
Lawyers are often implicated in corporate scandals, so it is not all that
surprising that they would have played an active role in the tax shelter market.
5
What is surprising is the response of the organized tax bar. Since the late 1990s,
in frequent reports and congressional testimony, representatives of the tax bar
have condemned tax shelters and offered proposals to strengthen the
government's capacity to combat them. The tax bar has advocated legislative
and regulatory measures that would expand disclosure requirements and
increase penalties for tax shelter purchasers. It has also sought regulation that
would strengthen the role of outside legal advisors in preventing clients from
participating in abusive shelters. In particular, the organized bar has urged the
Treasury to impose due diligence requirements on opinions provided by legal
advisors for their clients to obtain protection against tax shelter penalties, a
6proposal adopted by the Treasury in December 2004. One segment of the tax
bar also supported legislation that would impose a strict liability regime for
abusive tax shelters,7 an idea pursued by Congress in recent tax shelter
legislation.
8
How should the initiatives of the organized tax bar be understood? The
working premise of most scholarship on lawyers is that bar associations serve
the narrow self-interest of their members.9 One approach posits bar
Threat to System, Summers Says, Feb. 29, 2000, Tax Notes Today, 2000 TNT 40-1. Not only do shelters
create enormous tax revenue losses, they are a highly inefficient use of corporate resources, create
inequities in tax administration, and foster disrespect for the tax system, contributing to more
widespread compliance problems.
3 See, e.g., Susan Beck, The Trojan Accountant, AM. LAW., Nov. 1999, at 18.
4 See, e.g., Beck, supra note 2; Braverman, supra note 2.
5 See, e.g., Susan Koniak, When the Hurly Burly's Done: The Bar's Struggle with the S.E.C.,
103 COLUM. L. REv. 1236, 1239-43 (2004) (lawyers' role in Enron scandal); William H. Simon, The
Kaye Scholer Affair: The Lawyer's Duty of Candor and the Bar's Temptations of Evasion and Apology,
23 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 243, 247-57 (1998) (law firm Kaye Scholer's role in savings and loan
debacle).
6 See 31 C.F.R. § 10.35 (2005). For a discussion of the role of opinion letters in the regulatory
regime that was applicable until recently, see infra notes 71-75 and accompanying text.
7 See infra Section lI.D.
8 See American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, 118 Stat. 1418 (2004).
9 See, e.g., Koniak, supra note 5, at 1269-80 (describing securities bar's efforts to water down
obligations under section 307 of Sarbanes-Oxley); Simon, supra note 5 (criticizing bar's failure to take
stance on possible wrongdoing of Kaye Scholer firm, which was charged with misconduct in connection
with representing failed thrift Lincoln Savings & Loan); Theodore Schneyer, Professionalism as
Politics: The Making of a Modern Legal Ethics Code, in LAWYERS' IDE.ALS/LAWYERS' PRACTICES:
TRANSFORMATIONS IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROFESSION 95, 121-24, 127-30 (Robert L. Nelson et al.
eds., 1992) (describing American Trial Lawyers Association's and American College of Trial Lawyers'
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organizations as preoccupied with lawyers' financial gain. In this view, bar
groups support proposals that increase the demand for or cost of lawyers'
services. 10 An alternative approach views lawyer associations, especially the
corporate bar, as advocates for clients' interests. In this view, the organized
corporate bar is intent on protecting corporate prerogatives and power.1 A third
approach, often intertwined with the others, treats the bar's law reform efforts
as gestures intended to fend off public criticism and oversight. In this view, bar
associations advocate regulatory changes that improve the public image of
lawyers but do not impinge on their practices.12 But the organized tax bar's
advocacy in the tax shelter context is difficult to square with any of these
approaches. Considered on their merits, the bar's proposals do not advance
either clients' or lawyers' immediate interests; nor can the bar's proposed
reforms be dismissed as diversionary tactics.'
3
In this Article, I offer an account of the organized tax bar's law reform
efforts that rejects the conventional views. 14 As I argue, short-term self-interest
does not adequately explain the tax bar's initiatives in the tax shelter area. I
successful efforts to weaken ethics rules imposing obligations to third parties); cf. George M. Cohen,
When Law and Economics Met Professional Responsibility, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 273, 296 (1998)
(arguing that by allowing lawyers to get more information from clients, confidentiality rule gives
lawyers a "leg up" on future business).
10 Commentators argue that law reform by the organized bar advances lawyers' financial
interests in various ways. One view is that bar groups seek legal rules that bring business to their
members, see, e.g., Paul H. Rubin & Martin J. Bailey, The Role of Lawyers in Changing the Law, 23 J.
LEGAL STUD. 807 (1994) (ATLA has sought tort law reforms that benefit lawyers), or increase the
general demand for lawyers, see Richard L. Abel, United States: The Contradictions of Professionalism,
in 2 LAWYERS IN SOCIETY: THE COMMON LAW WORLD 186, 212-18 (Richard L. Abel & Philip S.C.
Lewis eds., 1988); Michelle J. White, Legal Complexity and Lawyers' Benefit from Litigation, 12 INT'L
REV. L. & ECON. 381 (1992). A second view is that bar reform initiatives are a means of maintaining the
profession's regulatory monopoly over the market for legal services. Unauthorized practice prohibitions,
for example, which the bar justifies as protecting the public, are actually intended to prevent competition
from non-lawyers. See, e.g., RICHARD L. ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERS 7 (1989). Other reforms, such as
the imposition of education and entry requirements, are explained as reducing competition among
lawyers by limiting supply. See id. at 40-71.
11 See, e.g., JEROLD S. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE 35-36, 62-64 (1976); see also Susan P.
Koniak, The Law Between the Bar and the State, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1389, 1487 (1992) (suggesting that the
laws supported by the bar are used to "justify lives dedicated to the powerful and their right to remain
powerful").
12 AUERBACH, supra note 11, at 64-65; Susan P. Koniak & George Cohen, In Hell There Will
be Lawyers Without Clients or Law, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 129, 138 (2001).
13 Several scholars of the legal profession have mounted challenges to the thesis that bar
associations are motivated solely by the material interests of their members. See, e.g., TERENCE C.
HALLIDAY, BEYOND MONOPOLY: LAWYERS, STATE CRISES, AND PROFESSIONAL EMPOWERMENT 3
(1987) (organized bar's historic efforts to reform the judiciary reflect normative commitment to liberal
democratic values); RONEN SHAMIR, MANAGING LEGAL UNCERTAINTY (1995) (corporate lawyers'
response to New Deal reflected in part attempt to shore up expert authority); Robert W. Gordon, "The
Ideal and the Actual in the Law ": Fantasies and Practices of New York City Lawyers, 1870-1910, in
THE NEW HIGH PRIESTS: LAWYERS IN POST-CIVIL WAR AMERICA 51 (Gerard W. Gawalt ed., 1984)
(founders of first bar organization motivated by progressive ideals).
14 The tax bar's reform efforts have not received much attention in either the scholarship on
tax shelters or tax ethics. In 1994, Professor Ted Schneyer noted efforts by the organized tax bar to reign
in the first wave of tax shelters. See Ted Schneyer, From Self-Regulation to Bar Corporatism: What the
S&L Crisis Means for the Regulation of Lawyers, 35 S. TEX. L. REV. 639, 657-58 (1994).
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suggest, instead, that the positions of the bar may be better understood as
attempts to reinforce the professional authority of elite tax lawyers, which had
been eroded by the tax shelter market. This authority has traditionally been
grounded in expertise in case law doctrines that take a purposive approach to
interpreting the Code. The spread of tax shelters has privileged textualist
approaches to legal interpretation and devalued these doctrines. The reforms
supported by the organized bar seek to reassert the primacy of judicially created
doctrines and, by extension, lawyers' role in applying them. Borrowing from
Bourdieu, I propose that tax practice is a field in which tax practitioners do not
just-or principally-compete for economic rewards. 15 More fundamentally,
they vie for the authority to dictate the terms in which the field is constituted.
The account of the organized tax bar's activities I offer rejects simple self-
interested explanations as well as explanations that claim that the bar is
motivated by pure public-mindedness. As I suggest, a more nuanced conception
of professionalism is at work. The bar's positions are animated by an account
of the well-being of the tax system that puts elite tax lawyers at the front and
center of safeguarding its integrity. Although the bar's initiatives, if enacted,
will not confer short-term economic benefits on lawyers or their clients, they
have the effect of enhancing tax lawyers' power and status.
Part I of this Article offers an account of the rise of corporate tax shelters.
I first provide an overview of abusive tax shelters and the purposive approaches
to statutory interpretation that courts developed to disallow shelter benefits.' 6 I
then describe the financial incentives, professional culture, and regulatory
backdrop in the 1990s that gave rise to the market for tax shelters and the
impact of these forces on the practices of tax lawyers. Attracted by financial
incentives, many lawyers joined big accounting firms, which took the lead in
the tax shelter market, to design and promote shelters.' 7 Others who remained
in traditional corporate law firms wrote opinion letters that gave questionable
15 See generally PIERRE BOURDIEU & LOIc J.D. WACQUANT, AN INVITATION TO REFLEXIVE
SOCIOLOGY 96-98 (1992).
16 Purposive approaches cover a range of interpretive theories. See, e.g., Joseph Bankman,
The Economic Substance Doctrine, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 5 (2000); Deborah A. Geier, Interpreting Tax
Legislation: The Role of Purpose, 2 FLA. TAX REV. 492 (1995); Michael Livingston, Practical Reason,
"Purposivism," and the Interpretation of Tax Statutes, 51 TAX L. REV. 677 (1996); Robert Thornton
Smith, Business Purpose: The Assault upon the Citadel, 53 TAX LAW. 1 (1999); Lawrence Zelenak,
Thinking About Nonliteral Interpretation of the Internal Revenue Code, 64 N.C. L. REV. 623 (1986). In
the wider scholarly literature, the debate between purposive and textualist approaches to statutory
interpretation is represented by William Eskridge, Philip Frickey, and Cass Sunstein, on the one hand,
see William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42
STAN. L. REv. 321 (1990); Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L.
REV. 405 (1989), and Justice Antonin Scalia, on the other, see, e.g., Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as
a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175 (1989); see also John F. Manning, The Eleventh Amendment
and the Reading of Precise Constitutional Texts, 113 YALE L.J. 1663 (2004) (arguing for a textualist
approach in constitutional interpretation).
17 At the beginning of the 1990s there were six first-tier accounting firms, Arthur Andersen &
Co., Coopers & Lybrand, Deloitte & Touche, Ernst & Young, KPMG, and Price Waterhouse. In 2005,
four remain. I generally refer to these firms in this Article as the "big firms."
Yale Journal on Regulation
transactions an imprimatur of legitimacy. In the weak regulatory environment
that prevailed, lawyers were not deterred from participating directly or
indirectly in the tax shelter market.
In response, tax bar associations advocated reforms to curb the tax shelter
market, which I unpack in Part II. The bar's proposals have sought to
strengthen the regulatory regime to deter corporate taxpayers from engaging in
tax shelter activity. Several of the bar's initiatives, moreover, assign legal
advisors a gatekeeping function that is not easily explained by lawyers'
economic interest. Tax lawyers are especially suited to this gatekeeping role
because of their expertise in the judicially created doctrines that developed to
distinguish abusive tax shelters from legitimate tax planning. In conferring this
role on tax lawyers, these proposals subscribe to a professional ideology in
which legal advisors not only serve as representatives of clients but also act as
guardians of the tax system. 18
Part III considers how the bar's positions restore tax lawyers' professional
authority. The first Section explores the centrality of courts in the tax bar's
account in developing and elaborating doctrines that are the basis of the
expertise enjoyed by elite tax lawyers. As I argue, the thrust of the bar's
reforms seek to affirm the value of this traditional expertise. The second
Section turns to the normative distinction between legitimate business activity
and tax planning for its own sake, which underlies the bar's proposals. In the
tax bar's account, this divide, which drives judicial doctrines, cannot be
formulated in a simple rule but requires articulation on a case-by-case basis.
The third Section addresses the professional stakes advanced by the bar's
initiatives. While the positions of the bar in the tax shelter controversy do not
further tax lawyers' short-term financial interests, they confer important long-
term benefits, including status that flows from tax lawyers' expertise in case
law and, particularly, in purposive approaches to statutory interpretation. This
status is threatened by the proliferation of tax shelters, which depend on
textualist readings of tax law. The tax bar's law reform initiatives can thus be
read as an attempt to regain professional authority in the tax law field.
Recent research has noted that lawyers in corporate practice are
increasingly willing to divest themselves of their professional personae,
refashioning themselves as "consultants" or "information specialists."' 9 The
organized tax bar's efforts to oppose the tax shelter market offer an important
18 I am using "professional ideology" to mean "the claims, values and ideas that provide the
rationale" for professional institutions. ELIOT FREIDSON, PROFESSIONALISM: THE THIRD LOGIC 105
(2001); see also Robert L. Nelson & David M. Trubek, New Problems and New Paradigms in Studies of
the Legal Profession, in LAWYERS' IDEALS/LAWYERS' PRACTICES: TRANSFORMATIONS IN THE
AMERICAN LEGAL PROFESSION, supra note 9 (arguing for interpretive approach to study of legal
profession that attends to ideologies of lawyers). This use is to be distinguished from the use of
"ideology" to mean false consciousness.
19 Robert Eli Rosen, "We're All Consultants Now": How Change in Client Organizational




counterexample. In tax practice, enduring conceptions of professionalism have
shaped the organized bar's positions into the twenty-first century. As the
emergence of the tax shelter industry illustrates, in private representation of
clients, lawyers' professional norms can quickly succumb to the pull of
powerful market forces. But in public activities, lawyers may still adhere to a
professional ideology that is in tension with a market ethos. In the tax shelter
context, organized bar activities have provided a space in which lawyers can
articulate and act on interests that go beyond immediate financial gain. While
tax lawyers' short term economic interests have led many of them to engage in
activities that undermine the tax system, their long term investment in a special
status as gatekeepers of the tax system has helped keep them in alignment with
the broader purposes of tax law.
I. The Rise of the Tax Shelter Market
Although aggressive tax planning dates back to at least the 1930s,21 the
tax shelter industry emerged in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Congress
effectively eradicated the first wave of tax shelters, which had been promoted
primarily by financial advisers to middle income individuals, when it enacted
22
rules that prohibit the use of passive losses to offset regular income in 1986.
The corporate tax shelter market survived these reforms and, over the next
decade, took off.23
20 Tax lawyers themselves divide the world of practice into those who participate in tax
shelters and those who do not. See, e.g., Peter C. Canellos, A Tax Practitioner's Perspective on
Substance, Form and Business Purpose in Structuring Business Transactions and in Tax Shelters, 54
SMU L. REV. 47, 55-57 (2001). Anecdotal evidence suggests, however, that established corporate firms,
whose own members have been active in bar reform efforts, are involved in much more aggressive tax
planning than they were a decade ago. E.g., Braverman, supra note 2.
21 See, e.g., Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
22 See Bankman, supra note 1, at 1776; George K. Yin, Getting Serious About Corporate Tax
Shelters: Taking a Lesson from History, 54 SMU L. REv. 209, 218-19 (2001).
23 The exact extent of losses to the government that have resulted from corporate tax shelters
is impossible to measure. Between 1996 and 2000 more than 60% of corporations avoided paying any
taxes. See U.S. General Accounting Office, COMPARISON OF THE REPORTED TAX LIABILITIES OF
FOREIGN AND U.S. CONTROLLED CORPORATIONS, 1996-2000 (2004). While corporations were able to
reduce some taxes by legally permissible means, a large part of the offset was likely the result of abusive
tax shelters. See id; Justin Lahart, Corporate Tax Burden Shows Sharp Decline, WALL ST. J., Apr. 13,
2004, at Cl; see also Braverman, supra note 2 (showing that even as corporate earnings were rising
between 1999-2002, corporate tax revenue collected by the IRS dropped 34%).
At the market's height in the late 1990s, the Clinton Administration estimated that the Treasury was
losing $10 billion a year in tax revenue from corporate tax shelters. Recent revelations suggest that tax
revenue losses were even greater. For example, a single tax shelter marketed by KPMG to twenty-nine
Fortune 500 companies under the acronym CLAS cost the Treasury $1.7 billion. See KPMG Shelter
Shaved $1.7 Billion off Taxes of 29 Large Companies, WALL ST. J., June 16, 2004, at Al; see also
Internal Revenue Service: Challenges Remain in Combating Abusive Tax Shelters: Hearing Before the
S. Comm. on Finance, 108th Cong. 13 (2003) (statement of Michael Brostek, Director, Tax Issues,
General Accounting Office) [hereinafter Brostek Statement] (IRS contractor estimated that illegal tax
shelters cost the government between $14.5 and $18.4 billion in 1999).
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A. Abusive Tax Shelters and the Role of Judicial Doctrines
Abusive tax shelters shield income from taxation by exploiting formal
dimensions of tax law in ways that are inconsistent with underlying substantive
tax principles. By their nature, shelters are not susceptible to precise definition,
but tend to share several identifying markers, typically characterized as
follows: First, the transaction creates a tax loss through an investment with
little financial risk and no significant potential for profit. The absence of any
business purpose or significant potential for profit is often apparent from a
close examination of the underlying economics of the transaction. Second, the
transaction involves a domestic corporation and a tax indifferent party and
permits the allocation of income, in excess of economic income, to the tax
indifferent party, leaving a loss, in excess of economic loss, to the domestic
taxpayer; alternatively, the transaction exploits other structural flaws in the
U.S. tax system or discrepancies in the interaction between the U.S. and other
systems. Third, the transaction has not been developed for a single taxpayer but
has been designed by a promoter to be marketed to Fortune 500 or large,
closely-held corporations. Because a shelter's results are at odds with generally
understood tax principles and policies, once detected, it is likely to be
challenged by the IRS in court or shut down by legislative or administrative
action.
24
These characteristics are illustrated in a transaction that was successfully
• • 25
challenged by the government in ACM Partnership v. Commissioner. This
shelter, which Colgate-Palmolive purchased from Merrill Lynch, took
advantage of a rule that accelerated taxation of income relative to economic
income at the beginning of a transaction, while permitting off-setting
deductions later on. By inserting a tax-indifferent party in the transaction, a
foreign party not subject to United States tax that functioned to absorb the
excess income generated at the outset, the taxpayer sought to take advantage of
deductions subsequently available. Although the taxpayer's deductions were
technically consistent with the applicable language of the Code, the Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit declined to recognize the transaction, concluding
that it lacked a business purpose and had been entered into solely for the tax
benefits it would produce.
26
The business purpose doctrine is one of a cluster of overlapping doctrines,
dating back to the 1930s, that courts have developed to disallow the tax benefits
24 See DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, THE PROBLEM OF CORPORATE TAX SHELTERS: DISCUSSION,
ANALYSIS AND LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS 11-24 (July 1999) [hereinafter WHITE PAPER]; N.Y. STATE
BAR ASS'N TAX SECTION, REPORT ON CORPORATE TAX SHELTERS OF NEW YORK STATE BAR
ASSOCIATION TAX SECTION (1999), in NYSBA Tax Section Applauds Some Anti-Corporate Tax Shelter
Proposals, Rejects Others, Apr. 23, 1999, Tax Notes Today, 1999 TNT 82-29 [hereinafter NYSBA
1999A COMMENTS]; Bankman, supra note 1, at 1777. Dana Trier, a tax partner at Davis Polk &
Wardwell, was the principal drafter of the NYSBA Tax Section report.
25 73 T.C.M. (CCH) 2189 (1997), affd in part, rev'd in part, 157 F.3d 231 (3d Cir. 1998).
26 See ACM P'ship v. Comm'r, 157 F.3d 231 (3d Cir. 1998).
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of abusive transactions. 27 These doctrines reflect a purposive approach to
interpreting the tax code. Under the substance-over-form and step-transaction
doctrines, the IRS has the authority to re-characterize a transaction for tax
purposes if the form of a transaction favored by the taxpayer belies its
substance. 28 Under the step-transaction doctrine, for instance, the IRS has the
power, in certain circumstances, to re-characterize a series of formally
independent steps as a single, integrated transaction for tax purposes.
29
The doctrines that have gotten the most play in the tax shelter controversy
focus on a taxpayer's purpose in entering into a transaction, and specifically
whether the taxpayer has a business purpose. As ACM illustrates, courts will
inquire as to whether a taxpayer has a reason-other than the avoidance of
federal taxes-to undertake a transaction or series of transactions. 30 Under the
economic substance doctrine, a variation of business purpose, a transaction will
be recognized for tax purposes if a taxpayer has meaningfully changed its
economic position.
3 1
The connection between these doctrines, which are typically applied in a
manner that contravenes the text of the Code, and Congress's intent in enacting
specific tax provisions is not completely clear. 32 One view is that Congress
assumes the ongoing relevance of long-standing judicial doctrines when it
revises the Code. Under this approach, the doctrines are treated as implicit in
27 See Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
28 See, e.g., ASA Investerings P'ship v. Comm'r, 76 T.C.M. (CCH) 325 (1998) (concluding
that foreign partner in transaction was lender to whom gains were wrongly allocated), af'd, 201 F.3d
505 (D.C. Cir. 2000); see also WHITE PAPER, supra note 24, at 46-51.
29 To "step-together" a series of transactions, the IRS must satisfy one of three tests. Under
the "binding commitment" test, the IRS has the power to integrate separate steps if the taxpayer was, at
the time of the first step, under a binding commitment to proceed with later steps. See, e.g., Comm'r v.
Gordon, 391 U.S. 83 (1968). Under the "end result" test, independent steps will be integrated if the
taxpayer intended the end result. See, e.g., King Enters., Inc. v. United States, 418 F.2d 511, 517 (Ct. Cl.
1969). Under the "interdependence" test, steps will be integrated if the steps were "so interdependent
that the legal relations created by one transaction would have been fruitless without completion of the
series." See Am. Bantam Car Co. v. Comm'r, 11 T.C. 397, 405 (1948), affdper curiam, 177 F.2d 513
(3d Cir. 1949); see also WHITE PAPER, supra note 24, at 50-51. Occasionally, taxpayers are able to
invoke the step-transaction doctrine successfully against the government. See, e.g., McDonald's Rests.
of Ill., Inc. v. Comm'r, 688 F.2d 520 (7th Cir. 1982).
30 See, e.g., ACMP'ship, 157 F.3d 231; Goldstein v. Comm'r, 364 F.2d 734 (2d Cir. 1966).
Mrs. Goldstein sought to shield her winnings in the Irish sweepstakes from taxation by borrowing nearly
$1 million at 4% annual interest and purchasing $1 million in Treasury bonds paying 2% annual interest.
After she prepaid the interest on the loan, she attempted to deduct the amount against her sweepstakes
winnings. The court disallowed the deduction on the grounds that the loan had "no substance or purpose
aside from the taxpayer's desire to obtain the tax benefit of an interest deduction." Id. at 741.
31 See, e.g., ACM P'ship, 157 F.3d 231; see also David P. Hariton, Sorting out the Tangle of
Economic Substance, 52 TAX LAW. 235 (1999); Martin J. McMahon, Jr., Economic Substance,
Purposive Activity, and Corporate Tax Shelters, 94 TAX NOTES 1017 (2002); Smith, supra note 16. Two
of these scholarly articles, which defend the doctrine, were written by well-established tax lawyers at
elite firms. Mr. Hariton is a law partner at Sullivan & Cromwell. Mr. Smith, is a law partner at
Linklaters.
32 See Bankman, supra note 16, at 11. Whether the Code should be approached like any other
statute or subject to special interpretive conventions is a matter of ongoing debate. See Livingston, supra
note 16.
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the statute, unless Congress has indicated otherwise.33 Another view is that
specific provisions of the Code should be read against the backdrop of the Code
as a whole. 34 Under this approach, the fundamental goal of the Code-reflected
in its terms, structure, and design-is to tax income minus the cost of
generating it.35 Many provisions of the Code have other purposes-to
encourage investment in low income housing for example-but, so long as
these other purposes are not at issue, the deductions permitted by the Code
should apply only to activities aimed at income generation. 36 Put another way,
"it cannot be plausibly supposed that Congress intended to sanction
transactions that would have no justification or consequence other than to
defeat the tax laws."
37
B. The Incentives Governing Tax Shelter Purchasers
During the 1990s, tax departments at many large companies experienced
pressure to de-emphasize traditional legal compliance and become profit
centers. 38 The value of tax and legal services, like other internal services, had
come under scrutiny from corporate management, and taxes emerged as a
natural locus to realize savings. Under a basic cost-benefit analysis, purchasing
tax shelters made sense financially.
Although the regulatory environment changed with the enactment of the
American Jobs Creation Act in 2004, before its passage, the absence of
meaningful regulatory impediments encouraged abusive shelter transactions.
39
Applicable penalties, which were set at 20%, were likely too low to have
meaningful deterrence value. More importantly, in most circumstances, they
were assumed not to apply because taxpayers routinely obtained opinion letters
from lawyers that served to abate penalties. Substantial understatements of tax
33 See Bankman, supra note 16, at 11-13.
34 See Deborah A. Geier, Commentary: Textualism and Tax Cases, 66 TEMP. L. REV. 445,
459-60 (1993); Geier, supra note 16, at 495-502 (1995).
35 See Geier, supra note 16, at 497.
36 For an attempt to justify this view under a "structural textualist" approach, distinct from the
economic substance doctrine, see Alexandra M. Walsh, Formally Legal, Probably Wrong: Corporate
Tax Shelters, Practical Reason and the New Textualism, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1541 (2001).
37 Smith, supra note 16, at 5.
38 See Bankman, supra note 1, at 1784; Robert Eli Rosen, As the Big 5 Become Multi-
Disciplinary Practices, Opportunities Abound for Tax Executives, 51 TAX EXECUTIVE 147, 147 (Mar. 1,
1999). See generally Robert L. Nelson & Laura Beth Nielsen, Cops, Counsels & Entrepreneurs:
Constructing the Role of Inside Counsel In Large Corporations, 34 LAW & SoC'Y REV. 457 (2000)
(describing emergence of entrepreneurial view of role of corporate counsel).
In 2000, the Treasury began to strengthen applicable regulations, and the IRS stepped up
enforcement. See infra notes 84-99 and accompanying text. As a consequence, the cost-benefit analysis
started to shift away from purchasing tax shelters. While it is too early to predict, the increased
enforcement of existing law and the enactment of new tax shelter provisions in the American Jobs
Creation Act of 2004 may significantly alter the calculus around participating in abusive shelters.
39 The American Jobs Creation Act, Pub. L. No. 108-357, 118 Stat. 1418, is the most
significant tax reform act since 1986. In addition to targeting abusive tax shelters, it contains tax
incentives for small businesses and agriculture and reflects numerous other tax reforms.
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liability attributable to investments in tax shelters were not subject to a penalty
if the taxpayer could meet the "reasonable cause and good faith" exception
contained in § 6664(c) of the Internal Revenue Code.40 Until recently, under
applicable regulations, reasonable cause existed (and the penalty was abated) if
the taxpayer reasonably relies in good faith on an opinion based on a
professional tax adviser's analysis of the pertinent facts and authorities that
unambiguously concludes that there is a "greater than 50-percent likelihood
that the tax treatment of the item will be upheld" if challenged by the Internal
Revenue Service. 41 Although other provisions could theoretically limit the
value of a more-likely-than-not opinion, as a practical matter, an opinion letter
from a law firm was believed to protect a taxpayer from exposure to the
substantial understatement and other more severe civil or criminal penalties.42
Apart from this ineffectual penalty scheme, the probability that the IRS
would detect that a highly complex financial transaction is a tax shelter was
slight. The IRS has not had adequate resources for enforcement. While the
number of business tax returns increased between 1996 and 2001, the staff of
the IRS was cut, and audits of companies with more than $250 million in assets
decreased by 38%.43 In addition, the typical time frame between the date a
corporation filed its tax return and an IRS audit was five years.44 This lengthy
time lag prevented the Service from addressing tax shelter behavior while it
was ongoing.
It was also difficult for the Service to discover tax shelters in connection
with the returns it did audit. Corporate tax returns typically run into the
thousands of pages. Tax shelters, moreover, are complex transactions usually
involving types of deductions or credits that can be claimed legitimately. Tax
40 Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4 (as of April 2003).
41 Treas. Reg. §§ 1.6662-4(g)(B), 1.6664-4(c), 1.6664-4(e)(B)(1) (as of April 2003).
Amendments to the regulations are discussed infra notes 89-94 and accompanying text.
42 On its face, I.R.C. § 6662(d)(2)(C) (2003) seemed to impose a strict liability penalty for
understatements of corporate tax that are a consequence of shelter investments. The legislative history of
§ 6664, however, established that the "reasonable cause" exception was still available to the taxpayer in
such circumstances. See Bankman, supra note 1, at 1778 n.2. Prior to their recent amendment, the
regulations promulgated pursuant to § 6664 required that, to meet the reasonable cause exception, a
taxpayer have substantial authority for its position and a reasonable belief that its position more likely
than not would be sustained if challenged. Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4(e)(3) (as of April 2003). Even if these
conditions were met, the IRS was empowered to find that the taxpayer did not have "reasonable cause,"
if the taxpayer's participation in the shelter lacked a business purpose, if the taxpayer claimed benefits
that were "unreasonable" in comparison to its investment in the shelter, or if the taxpayer had purchased
the shelter under conditions of confidentiality. Id. Despite this regulatory authority, it was widely
assumed that the IRS considered a more-likely-than-not opinion sufficient to abate the substantial
underpayment penalty. See Bankman, supra note 1, at 1779. In later years, the IRS became more
aggressive in asserting penalties against taxpayers who claimed to have relied on legal opinions. See,
e.g., Long-Term Capital Holdings v. United States, 330 F. Supp. 2d 122 (D. Conn. 2004).
43 See David Cay Johnston, Corporate Risk of Tax Audit is Still Shrinking, I.R.S. Data Show,
N.Y. TimEs, Apr. 12, 2004, at Cl. For companies with more than $250 million in assets, the audit rate
fell from 33.7% in 2002 to 29% in 2003. Before 1996, the audit rate for companies this size was over
50%. Id.
44 See Bob Wells, IRS Chief Wants To Speed up Corporate Tax Audits, WALL ST. J. ONLINE,
Mar. 15, 2004, http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,BTCO 20040315_005286,00.html.
Yale Journal on Regulation Vol. 23:77, 2006
shelter purchasers had strong incentives not to signal their participation on their
returns since, before 2004, the failure to disclose did not affect whether the
penalty for substantial understatement of tax liabilities applied.45
C. The Role ofAccounting Firms
Tax professionals had powerful economic incentives to participate in the
tax shelter business. Shelter promoters stood to earn very substantial fees.
Typically, tax shelters were sold on a "value-added" or contingency fee based
on the amount of tax saved. While expensive to develop, a single tax shelter
sold to hundreds of clients could earn a promoter tens of millions of dollars.46
Until recently, no regulations meaningfully inhibited promoters from marketing
tax shelters. In addition, promoters assumed that their activities did not expose
them to civil or criminal liability.47
Although they were not the only promoters of tax shelters, the big
accounting firms were at the forefront of developing the shelter market. Their
leadership role resulted from a mix of long-standing and more recent trends.
Since the income tax was enacted in the early twentieth century, accountants'
primary practice in tax has been to assist clients in the preparation of tax
48
returns. Consistent with an emphasis on return preparation, the dominant
interpretive approach of tax accountancy has historically been textualist.
49
45 Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4 (as of April 2003).
46 For example, KPMG earned $53 million from one tax shelter it sold to 186 individuals. See
Tanina Rostain, Travails in Tax: KPMG and the Tax-Shelter Controversy, in LEGAL ETHICS: LAW
STORIES 89, 101 (Deborah L. Rhode & David J. Luban eds., 2005).
47 Since 2002, high-wealth taxpayers have begun to sue accounting firms who sold them tax
shelters after the Service disallowed the tax benefits of such transactions. See Cassell Bryan-Low, Deals
and Deal Makers: Clients 'Suits over Tax Shelters Shed Light on Accountants'Advice, WALL ST. J., Jan.
16, 2003, at C5. In addition, in 2002 the Service began to initiate enforcement actions against various
accounting firms. See infra note 68. In 2004 the Justice Department launched grand jury investigations
of Ernst & Young and KPMG. See Cassell Bryan-Low, KPMG Tax-Shelter Probe Grows, as U.S.
Classifies 30 as 'Subjects,' WALL ST. J., Mar. 5, 2004, at A2; Jonathan Weil, Ernst & Young Faces Tax-
Shelter Inquiry, WALL ST. J., May 24, 2004, at Cl. Many of the litigation and enforcement activities
thus far have focused on tax shelters sold to individuals.
48 From early on, the statute required businesses to compute their taxes based on their book-
keeping methods, so long as such methods clearly reflected income. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 212(b) (1924).
Businesses that had not previously bothered to keep books rushed to hire accountants to implement
book-keeping practices and compile financial information to comply with the statute. See MICHAEL
CHATFIELD, A HISTORY OF ACCOUNTING THOUGHT 207 (1974). As a consequence, the enactment of the
corporate and income tax statutes in the early twentieth century vastly increased the demand for
accountants' services. Id.
49 The textualist thrust of tax accountancy is best captured in the more than twenty-five
editions of the tax accountancy practice guide published between 1917 and 1958 by Robert Montgomery
and his associates at the accounting firm of Lybrand, Ross Bros. & Montgomery, the progenitor of
Coopers & Lybrand (now absorbed into PricewaterhouseCoopers). See, e.g., ROBERT H. MONTGOMERY,
INCOME TAX PROCEDURE (1923); ROBERT H. MONTGOMERY, FEDERAL TAX HANDBOOK; REVENUE
ACT OF 1932 (1932); see also MONTGOMERY's FEDERAL TAXES (1957). Montgomery has long been
considered the undisputed leader of the field. See, e.g., Charles J. Gaa, Book Review, 37 ACCT. REV.
598 (1962) (reviewing LYBRAND, ROSS BROS. & MONTGOMERY, MONTGOMERY'S FEDERAL TAXES
(38th ed. 1961)); see also Joseph Bankman, The Business Purpose Doctrine and the Sociology of Tax,
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Insofar as the goal of return preparation is to reach the correct calculation of
taxable income, it is a service that favors bright-line rules over broad
standards.50 In addition, tax accountancy has traditionally been marked by an
antagonistic orientation toward tax that has accentuated its textualist
perspective.
5 1
During the last thirty years, big accounting firms underwent important
market and organizational changes that contributed to their eagerness to enter
and develop the shelter market. For most of their history, the big accounting
firms did not emphasize tax services, but offered them to corporate clients as an
ancillary to independent audits, the core service around which they built their
reputations. 52 But in the 1970s, the big firms began to experience significant
competitive pressures in their audit practices, leading to a steady decline in
profitability in this area. 53 At first, firms found a panacea in consulting services,
which, by the early 1990s, had eclipsed audit as a source of revenue. 54 With the
54 SMU L. REv. 149, 152-54 (2001) (accountants more comfortable with rules; lawyers more
comfortable with standards).
Richard Lavoie has attributed the increase of tax shelter activity among professionals to the new
textualism espoused by several members of the U.S. Supreme Court. See Richard Lavoie, Subverting the
Rule of Law: The Judiciary's Role in Fostering Unethical Behavior, 75 U. COLO. L. REv. 115 (2004). In
tax decisions, as in other cases, textualism has enjoyed a significant revival. In recent years, it has served
as the basis for several circuit court decisions reversing IRS victories in the tax court. See Compaq
Computer Corp. v. Comm'r, 277 F.3d 778 (5th Cir. 2001); United Parcel Serv. v. Comm'r, 254 F.3d
1014 (1 ith Cir. 2001); IES Indus., Inc. v. United States, 253 F.3d 350 (8th Cir. 2001); see also TIFD III-
E Inc. v. United States (Castle Harbour), 342 F. Supp. 2d 94 (D. Conn. 2004); Black & Decker Corp. v.
United States, 340 F. Supp. 2d 621 (D. Md. 2004); Coltec Indus. Inc. v. United States, 62 Fed. Cl. 716
(2004). But this approach enjoys a long pedigree in the field of tax accountancy.
50 Several historical factors may have contributed to tax accountancy's textualist approach to
the income tax laws. In their day-to-day return preparation work, tax accountants have had to deal with
the ongoing difficulty of trying to make sense of a complicated set of laws that changed biennially, or
even annually, becoming more convoluted with each revision. This challenge created an impetus toward
simplifying terms and concepts, at the expense of addressing the varying goals underlying the Code. See,
e.g., ROBERT H. MONTGOMERY, FEDERAL TAX HANDBOOK, 1934-35 (1934). From the beginning,
moreover, there was a fundamental lack of fit between the core concepts of accountancy and their
counterparts in tax law. Over the years, methods of computing taxable and financial income continued to
diverge, as tax concepts developed to further social and political goals that were foreign to
accountancy's aim of measuring income. See CHATFIELD, supra note 48, at 208-10; Ray M. Sommerfeld
& John E. Easton, The CPA's Tax Practice Today and How It Got That Way, J. ACCT., May 1987, at
166, 172-74.
51 See GARY JOHN PREVITS & BARBARA DUBiS MERINO, A HISTORY OF ACCOUNTANCY IN
THE UNITED STATES: THE CULTURAL SIGNIFICANCE OF ACCOUNTING 255 (1998). Montgomery
articulated and undoubtedly magnified the disdain in which tax accountants have held the tax system in
the prefaces to his highly popular handbook. Taking stock of the previous year's changes in the tax
statute, his assessments were almost invariably negative. See, e.g., MONTGOMERY, supra note 50, at 36-
37; ROBERT H. MONTGOMERY, FEDERAL TAX HANDBOOK, 1940-41, at 54 (1940).
52 See MIKE BREWSTER, UNACCOUNTABLE: HOW THE ACCOUNTING PROFESSION FORFEITED
A PUBLIC TRUST 42-98 (2003); Rostain, supra note 46.
53 See BREWSTER, supra note 52, at 162-64; Rostain, supra note 46.
54 In 1975, audit fees of the Big Eight comprised between 60% and 75% of their total fees. By
1985, audit fees were between 50% and 65%. See Stephen Zeff, Does the CPA Belong to a Profession?,
1 ACCT. HORIZONS 65, 67 (1987). Six years later, non-audit work represented more than 50% of the big
firms' total revenues. O'DWYER'S PR SERVICES REPORT, October 1995, at I, cited in BREWSTER, supra
note 52, at 180. Over the next ten years fees from audit continued to decline. See Special Report,
BOWMAN'S ACCT. REP., Mar./Apr. 2002, at 2-3.
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rise of consulting, a client-centered sales approach, which focused on the
benefits of services to corporate management, took over.55 Offering "value-
added" services to keep management satisfied became the reigning ethos.
By the late 1990s, the big firms had adapted the consulting approach to
tax services. With the financial boom, firms discovered new opportunities to
exploit in the tax shelter market. Whereas tax advice had earlier been tailored to
the needs of specific clients, firms now turned to the development of tax
products that could be sold en masse. This shift was spurred by the availability
of value-added fees, which could be fixed at a percentage of a client's
anticipated tax savings. 56 Such fees acted effectively as sales commissions,
permitting accounting firms to make ever larger profits with each tax product
sold.
The largest professional organizations in the world, big accounting firms
were able to take advantage of their bureaucratic structure, global reach, and
enormous client base to take the lead in the industry.57 Recognizing the profit
potential of tax shelters, firms dedicated substantial organizational resources to
development and marketing.58 Specialized groups were created within firms for
the sole purpose of designing new tax products.59 Rather than serving the
individualized needs of clients, tax practitioners in these groups focused on
identifying obscure provisions of the Code, new financing devices, and esoteric
legal forms that could be combined to develop innovative products. The
55 As Mike Brewster emphasizes, this consulting ethos spread to audit services, which was
marketed as a tool to yield information useful to corporate managers. See BREWSTER, supra note 52, at
177-79.
56 See Rostain, supra note 46, at 95. The importance of contingency fees in driving the tax
shelter market has led one commentator to argue for a broad ban of such fees in tax services. See Ben
Wang, Supplying the Tax Shelter Industry: Contingent Fee Compensation for Accountants Spurs
Production, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 1237 (2003).
57 See Rostain, supra note 46, at 95-96. As of 1998, the world revenue of the then Big Five
ranged from $9.5 billion, for KPMG, to $15.3 billion, for PricewaterhouseCoopers. See Special Report,
BOWMAN'S ACCT. REP., Mar. 1999. Their clients constituted over 98% of the companies listed on the
New York Stock Exchange. See Annual Survey of Public Accounting Firms, PUBLIC ACCT. REP., Feb.
28, 1999.
58 See Rostain, supra note 46, at 97-104. The resources devoted by KPMG to developing tax
products are described in detail in STAFF OF PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS OF S. COMM.
ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 108TH CONG., U.S. TAX SHELTER INDUSTRY: THE ROLE OF
ACCOUNTANTS, LAWYERS, AND FINANCIAL PROFESSIONALS (2003), Tax Notes Today, 2003 TNT 223-
20 [hereinafter U.S. TAx SHELTER INDUSTRY]. The subcommittee's report emphasizes the development
and marketing of tax products to individuals and mid-size corporations, which have received the most
publicity thus far. Last year, the IRS disclosed that KPMG sold a tax shelter, which the Service
subsequently found to be abusive, to twenty-nine Fortune 500 companies. This shelter earned the firm
$20 million in fees. See KPMG Shelter Shaved 1.7 Billion off Taxes of29 Companies, WALL ST. J., June
16, 2004, at A]; see also Novak & Saunders, supra note 2 (describing development and marketing
efforts at PricewaterhouseCoopers).
59 See Rostain, supra note 46, at 97. See U.S. TAX SHELTER INDUSTRY, supra note 58, at
para. 81-83; accord Timothy Morris & Laura Empson, Organization and Expertise: An Exploration of
Knowledge Bases and the Management of Accounting and Consulting Firms, 23 ACCT. ORG. & SOC.
609, 617 (1998).
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development process was driven by profitability and speed to market.60
Designed to minimize taxes, standardized tax products did not address the
specific business goals of clients. These goals had to be identified (or
manufactured) after the fact during the sales process to provide the client with a
business purpose for engaging in the transactions in question.61 Once a product
was approved, firms engaged in a marketing blitz to sell it.
62
During the 1990s, firms intensified their recruitment of tax lawyers. They
increased starting salaries to attract recent law school graduates. 63 They also
succeeded in hiring many experienced tax partners from corporate firms,
offering them substantially higher incomes than they were earning in traditional
practice.64 Between 1997 and 2001, revenue from tax services in the United
States grew approximately 20% a year, with increases in the lower double
digits in later years.65 In 1998, the revenue from tax services to the Big Five
accounting firms was between 18% and 23% of total revenue, representing
between $800 million and $1 billion in revenue to each firm. 66 In 2002, after
most of the big firms had divested themselves of their consulting services,
revenues from tax services were between 21% and 36%, representing between
$1.1 and $1.6 billion.67 With so much money to be made, second-tier
accounting firms, investment banks, and law firms were soon eagerly designing
and marketing new tax shelters.
68
60 See Rostain, supra note 46, at 97-102. See U.S. TAX SHELTER INDUSTRY, supra note 58, at
para. 81-135.
61 See Rostain, supra note 46, at 100. See, e.g., U.S. TAX SHELTER INDUSTRY, supra note 58,
at para. 189-206.
62 See Rostain, supra note 46, at 102-04. See, e.g., U.S. TAX SHELTER INDUSTRY, supra note
58, at para. 136-182 (KPMG). Professionals throughout the firm, including audit professionals, were
expected to engage in aggressive efforts to sell products. Firms mined their enormous client databases as
well as public databases for potential purchasers, engaged in hard-sell tactics, and even used
telemarketing methods. Id. The tax shelter sales team at Deloitte & Touche was known inside the
industry as the "Predator" group. See Jeremy Kahn, Do Accountants Have a Future?, FORTUNE, Mar. 3,
2003, at 115.
63 See, e.g., Anna Snider, Taking a Look Inside the Big Five, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 7, 1999, at S 11;
John T. Lanning, KPMG Recruiting Pitch: Practice Tax, LEGAL TIMES, Sept. 6, 1999, at S42.
64 See Amy Boardman & Carrie Johnson, Accounting for Competition: As Tax Lawyers Jump
to the Big Six, Rivalry Grows Between Attorneys, Accountants, LEGAL TIMES, Feb, 3, 1997, at S1; Big
Five Court Tax Attorneys: Many Make Leap as Accounting Firms Work To Expand Their Legal Reach,
CRAIN'S N.Y. Bus., Mar. 22, 1999, at 13; Ernst & Young Scores Another Top Tax Lawyer, THE
RECORDER, Mar. 25 1999, at 1; Tax Report, WALL ST. J., Feb. 2,2000, at AI; Big Five Pays Top Dollar
for Tax Partners-Especially KPMG, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 6, 2000, at B8; see also Tanina Rostain, Pockets
of Professionalism, 54 STAN. L. REv. 1475, 1482 (2000).
65 See Special Report, 14 BOWMAN'S AcCT. REP., Mar. 2000, at 2 [hereinafter 2000 Special
Report]; Special Report, supra note 54, at 2-3.
66 See 2000 Special Report, supra note 65, at 8.s
67 See Special Report, BOWMAN'S ACCOUNTING REPORT, Mar./Apr. 2003, at 2-3.
68 BDO Seidman is a second-tier accounting firm that has participated in tax shelters. It
became the subject of IRS enforcement summonses in 2000. See David L. Lupi-Sher et al., IRS Moves
Aggressively Against Firms Marketing Tax Shelters, 96 TAx NOTES 338, 338 (2002). In 2000, its tax
products group, known internally as the "wolf pack," earned the firm $100 million from shelter sales.
See Cassell Bryan-Low, Accounting Firms Face Backlash over the Tax Shelters They Sold, WALL ST. J.,
Feb. 7, 2003, at Al. The Service has also brought an enforcement action against Grant Thornton. See
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The enforcement environment during the late 1990s failed to discourage
tax shelter promoters. Promoter listing and registration requirements were in
effect, but the Service did little to enforce them.69 During the market's heyday,
shelter promoters apparently did not observe registration and listing
obligations, reasoning that penalty exposure would be significantly lower than
the profits to be made from selling tax shelters without disclosing them to the
IRS.7"
D. The Role of Outside Legal Advisers
Lawyers who eschewed direct involvement in development and sales were
still able to profit handsomely from the tax shelter boom by writing opinion
letters for clients. Opinion letters were a sine qua non of tax shelter purchases,
Sheryl Stratton, IRS Gets John Doe Summons for Grant Thornton, Updates Shelter Stats, TAX
ANALYSTS, Oct. 29, 2003, Tax Notes Today, 2003 TNT 209-2. Investment banks involved in tax
shelters include Bear, Steams and Merrill Lynch. See ACM v. Comm'r, 157 F.3d 231 (3d Cir. 1998);
Anita Raghavan, Bear Stearns Taking a Hit on Tax Accord, WALL ST. J., Aug. 7, 1997, at C1. Among
law firms, Brown & Wood, now absorbed into Sidley Austin Brown & Wood, and Sutherland, Asbill &
Brennan have been targeted by the government and former clients in connection with their tax shelter
practices. See U.S. TAX SHELTER INDUSTRY: THE ROLE OF ACCOUNTANTS, LAWYERS, AND FINANCIAL
PROFESSIONALS, supra note 58; David Cay Johnston, I.R.S. Seeking Buyers' Names in Tax Shelters,
N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 2003, at Cl. Jenkens recently settled a civil action brought by former clients
arising out of its tax shelter activities for $75 million. See Cassell Bryan-Low, Jenkens & Gilchrist
Agrees To Pay $75 Million in Tax-Shelter Case, WALL ST. J., Mar. 8, 2004, at C3.
69 During the first wave of tax shelters in the 1980s, Congress required promoters to register
certain tax shelters with the IRS and to maintain lists of shelter investors. See I.R.C. § 6112 (1984).
Section 6111 was drafted principally to target the shelter investments then in vogue. Wider in scope, §
6112 required promoters to keep lists of investors in shelters covered under § 6111, as well as investors
in "potentially abusive shelters," defined as any entity, investment plan, or arrangement identified by the
Treasury in regulations as having potential for tax avoidance or evasion. I.R.C. § 6112(b). In 1982,
Congress also created penalties for promoting abusive tax shelters and aiding and abetting the
understatement of tax. See I.R.C. §§ 6700, 670. In 1997, Congress added a provision to § 6111 that
required registration with the IRS of corporate tax shelters sold under conditions of confidentiality. See
I.R.C. § 611 l(d) (1997). The Treasury did not enact regulations to put § 611 l(d) into effect until 2000.
See Temp. Treas. Reg. § 301.611 1-2T (2000); infra note 89 and accompanying text. Since 2002, four of
the formerly Big Five accounting firns have been defendants in enforcement actions by the IRS See,
e.g., DOJ Argues Emergency Motion for Stay Pending Appeal Should Be Denied, Tax Notes Today,
Nov. 4, 2002, 2002 TNT 213-58 (describing enforcement action against Ernst & Young); United States
v. KPMG, L.L.P., 237 F. Supp. 2d 35 (D.D.C. 2002); United States v. Arthur Andersen, L.L.P., 2003
WL 21956404 (N.D. II1., Aug. 15, 2003); PwC Pays IRSfor Not Following Shelter Rules, BOWMAN'S
ACCT. REP., Jul. 1,2002.
70 An internal memo released by the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations
during its investigation of KPMG in 2003 illustrates the approach taken to shelter registration
requirements by tax professionals at the firm. See Memorandum from Gregg W. Ritchie to Jeffrey N.
Stein, May 26, 1998, Tax Notes Today, 2003 TNT 240-52. The memo assumed that the tax product at
issue was a tax shelter subject to section 6111 's registration requirements. It nevertheless concluded that
the product should not be registered because of the "immediate negative impact on the Firm's strategic
initiative to develop a sustainable tax products practice and the long-term implications of establishing a
precedent in registering such a product." Id. The memo's author went on to argue that the firm's
financial exposure was minimal, other promoters were not registering tax shelters so that registering the
product would put the firm at a "severe competitive disadvantage," and the Service had demonstrated a
"lack of enthusiasm" for enforcing the registration requirements. Id.
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since they were assumed to provide protection against penalties under § 6662.71
A corporate client could satisfy the good faith requirement if it reasonably
relied on a legal opinion unambiguously concluding that there was a greater
than 50% chance that the tax treatment of the item would be upheld if
72challenged by the IRS. In recognizing that advice of counsel was a factor in
assessing good faith, this provision reflected the traditional concept that a
party's reliance on advice of counsel militates against finding that the party
willfully violated the law.73 Under this principle, a lawyer's advice protects a
client on the assumption that the lawyer will engage in disinterested and
diligent efforts to ascertain her client's legal obligations. With the rise of the
tax shelter market, this function was subverted, and opinions served simply as
penalty insurance. 74 In shopping for opinions on tax shelters, corporate clients
were less interested in the content of an opinion than whether a lawyer was
willing to provide one.
75
Regulatory mechanisms failed to deter the proliferation of opinions
approving highly questionable transactions. Circular 230, the regulations that
govern tax practice before the IRS, did not specifically address more-likely-
than-not opinions before 2004.76 The general standards for tax advice in the
regulations did not inhibit lawyers from providing opinions for abusive
transactions; nor had the American Bar Association enunciated stricter
standards.
77
Efforts to enforce ethical standards that focused on whether the more-
likely-than-not standard had been met were vulnerable to the substantive
71 See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
72 See Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4(e)(2)(B)(2) (as of April 2003).
73 This doctrine appears in criminal law as the principle that following counsel's advice can
negate a finding of mens rea. See, e.g., John T. Parry, Culpability, Mistake, and Official Interpretations
of Law, 25 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1 (1997). This principle is captured in the tax context by the following
scenario: A client is unsure of how to determine its tax liabilities and seeks advice from counsel to make
sure that the tax treatment it favors is correct. Having relied on this advice, the client should not be
penalized if the lawyer provides the wrong analysis.
74 See, e.g., Bankman, supra note 1, at 1782; NYSBA 1999A, supra note 24, at 893. As the
New York State Bar Tax Section noted, clients contemplating an aggressive transaction avoided
consulting with their regular experienced counsel for fear of losing the protection of the reasonable
cause exception. See id
75 Id.
76 See Circular 230, 31 C.F.R. pt. 10 (2000). Section 10.34 of Circular 230 provided, in
relevant part, that a practitioner could not advise a client to take a position on a tax return unless the
practitioner determined that the position has a realistic possibility of success. Id. § 10.34(a)(1). This
standard was defined as having a one in three, or greater, likelihood of being sustained on the merits. Id.
§ 10.34(d)(1). At the time, the only provision of Circular 230 that addressed tax shelter opinions was
section 10.33, which addressed opinions to market shelters to third parties. The ABA's successful effort
to convince the Treasury to enact due diligence standards for opinion letters is described infra notes 115-
132 and accompanying text.
77 Like Circular 230, ABA Formal Opinion 85-352 prohibited a lawyer from recommending a
position on a tax return that falls below "some realistic possibility of success." ABA Comm. on Ethics
and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 85-352 (1985). ABA Formal Opinion 346, issued in 1982, deals
only with tax shelter opinions used for marketing purposes. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l
Responsibility, Formal Op. 346 (1982) [hereinafter Formal Opinion 346].
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ambiguities that pervade this area of law. When well-regarded tax practitioners
disagreed about whether particular transactions were abusive, it was difficult to
claim that a more-likely-than-not opinion clearly fell below an acceptable
threshold. Potential malpractice exposure was also not a meaningful deterrent.
Given the ambiguities in this area of the law, it was difficult to argue that an
opinion failed to meet the professional standard of care.78 Moreover, a
corporate client would encounter difficulty in proving that it had relied on an
opinion in entering into a transaction, since corporations typically did not use
opinions to evaluate transactions' merits, which had already been vetted by in
house tax lawyers, but to avoid penalties.
79
At the height of the shelter market, fees for opinion letters ran into the
hundreds of thousands of dollars, with some even commanding $1 million or
more. 80 The complexity of the Code, the availability of textualist interpretative
approaches, and the powerful economic incentives to reach a positive
evaluation led lawyers to issue more-likely-than not opinions for questionable
transactions. Under the circumstances, it was not that difficult for a lawyer to
conclude in good faith that a tax device, which at first glance may have seemed
to have a less than 50% chance of success, after further consideration, had a
greater than 50% chance. This lawyer would know too that if she declined to
provide an opinion, her client could easily find a lawyer who would.8'
With the expansion of the tax shelter market, tax textualism began to gain
currency among lawyers as an approach to tax interpretation. 82 Many tax
lawyers who went to work at accounting firms designed shelter products that
used formal categories in the Code. Lawyers who remained at law firms felt
pressure from clients eager to participate in abusive shelters. As a result, many
of them provided opinion letters that emphasized how transactions fit within
the terms of the statute, eliding the question of whether the transactions had an
underlying business purpose or economic substance.
II. The Organized Tax Bar's Role in Law Reform
While individual tax lawyers were reaping substantial financial benefits
from tax shelter work, the organized tax bar was involved in law reform
initiatives directed at reining in the market. Some participants in the debate
78 See Bankman, supra note 1, at 1782.
79 See id. at 1782-83. As of 1999, no lawyers had been sued in connection with issuing
opinion letters. See Beck, supra note 2. In 2003, several individual taxpayers sued their lawyers after the
IRS disallowed tax benefits from tax shelters they had purchased. See David Cay Johnston, Wealthy Sue
Accountants over Shelters, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 2003, at Cl. Jenkens & Gilchrist recently settled such a
lawsuit for $75 million. See Cassell Bryan-Low, supra note 68. Reliance is easier for individuals to
establish than for corporations, which presumably rely on in-house tax lawyers to assess the merits of
shelter transactions.
80 See Johnston, supra note 2; Novak & Saunders, supra note 2, at 198.
81 See NYSBA 1999A COMMENTS, supra note 24, at 893; Bankman, supra note 1, at 1782-83.
82 See Bankman, supra note 49, at 153-54.
Vol. 23:77, 2006
Sheltering Lawyers
insisted that no problem existed or, if it did, that it could be adequately
addressed by tougher IRS enforcement of existing laws. In contrast, the tax bar
argued that abusive shelters posed a significant threat to the integrity of the tax
system and embarked on sustained law reform efforts to address the problem.
A. Legislative and Regulatory Initiatives
Abusive tax shelters began to receive systematic attention in the late
1990s.8 3 During preceding years, Congress and the Treasury had shut down
various tax shelters, saving the Treasury tens of billions of dollars.84 The
Treasury had also issued anti-abuse rules targeted to specific provisions of the
Code.85 On the judicial front, the IRS had won a handful of cases, successfully
invoking business purpose and related doctrines to challenge several abusive
transactions.8
6
By the end of the decade, however, it was clear that a piecemeal approach,
which targeted specific shelters after they came to the attention of government
officials, could not address the scope of the problem. In 1999, the Clinton
Administration offered a series of legislative proposals with more far-reaching
87
effects. These proposals focused on increasing disclosure by taxpayers,
strengthening the penalty scheme, increasing the power of the Service to
83 After the cover story in Forbes appeared, see Novak & Saunders, supra note 2, several
congressional committees held hearings on the issue. Revenue Provisions in President's Fiscal Year
2000 Budget: Hearing Before the H. Comm. On Ways and Means, 106th Cong. (1999); Corporate Tax
Shelters: Hearing Before the H. Comm. On Ways and Means, 106th Cong. (1999); Revenue Raising
Proposals in the Administration's Fiscal Year 2000 Budget: Hearing Before the S. Comm. On Finance,
106th Cong. (1999); STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 106TH CONG., STUDY OF PRESENT-LAW
PENALTY AND INTEREST PROVISIONS As REQUIRED BY SECTION 3801 OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE
SERVICE RESTRUCTURING AND REFORM ACT OF 1998 (INCLUDING PROVISIONS RELATED TO TAX
SHELTERS) (Comm. Print 1999). Witnesses included several representatives of the tax bar, who testified
about the aggressive marketing of tax products with no purpose other than tax avoidance. Corporate Tax
Shelters: Hearing Before the H. Comm. On Ways and Means, 106th Cong. 60-67 (1999) (statement of
Paul J. Sax, Chair, Section of Taxation, ABA) [hereinafter Sax Statement A]; Revenue Raising
Proposals in the Administration 's Fiscal Year 2000 Budget: Hearing Before the S. Comm. On Finance,
106th Cong. (1999) (statement of Stefan F. Tucker, Chair, Section of Taxation, ABA) [hereinafter
Tucker Statement A], Tax Notes Today, 1999 TNT 47-65; see also STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON
TAXATION, DESCRIPTION AND ANALYSIS OF PRESENT-LAW TAX RULES AND RECENT PROPOSALS
RELATING TO CORPORATE TAX SHELTERS (Comm. Print 1999).
84 See WHITE PAPER, supra note 24, at ii-iii, 4-6. For a chart illustrating the increase in
individual transactions listed by the Treasury since 1999, see Brostek Statement, supra note 23, at 8.
85 See WHITE PAPER, supra note 24, at 38-41.
86 See ACM P'ship v. Comm'r, 157 F.3d 231 (3d Cir. 1998); ASA Investerings P'ship v.
Comm'r, 76 T.C.M. (CCH) 325 (1998), affd, 201 F.3d 505 (D.C. Cir. 2000). In 2001, the Service
suffered several judicial setbacks when some of its tax court victories in shelter cases were reversed on
appeal. Compaq Computer Corp. v. Comm'r, 277 F.3d 778 (5th Cir. 2001); IES Indus., Inc. v. United
States, 253 F.3d 350 (8th Cir. 2001); United Parcel Serv. v. Comm'r, 254 F.3d 1014 (11th Cir. 2001).
The pendulum has begun to swing in the other direction. See, e.g., Long-Term Capital Holdings, LP v.
United States, No. 04-5687, 2005 WL 2365336 (2d Cit. Sept. 27, 2005).
87 See DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S
REVENUE PROPOSALS (1999), available at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/docs/grnbk99.pdf
[hereinafter ADMINISTRATION'S 2000 REVENUE PROPOSALS].
Yale Journal on Regulation Vol. 23:77, 2006
disallow tax shelters, and imposing sanctions on tax shelter promoters and other
88third party participants. In 2000, the Treasury also issued temporary
regulations under previously enacted legislation that required the registration of
confidential corporate tax shelters, 89 the maintenance of lists of investors in
potentially abusive shelters, 90 and the disclosure of tax avoidance ("reportable")
transactions on taxpayers' returns.91 Prodded by the ABA Tax Section, the
Treasury also began to consider revisions of Circular 230 that would include
due diligence standards for more-likely-than-not opinions provided in
conjunction with tax shelters.92
In subsequent years, the Bush Administration continued to address the
corporate tax shelter problem through similar regulatory and legislative
initiatives.93 In particular, it focused on strengthening the reporting regime so
that the IRS would have systematic information about potentially abusive tax
shelters. In 2002, the Treasury issued temporary regulations expanding the
categories of transactions subject to the promoter list maintenance and taxpayer
reporting requirements under §§ 6112 and 6011, which became final in 2003.94
To provide meaningful incentives to disclose, the. Treasury proposed
88 See WHITE PAPER, supra note 24, at 77-112.
89 See Temp. Treas. Reg. § 301.6111-2T (2000). Because part of the calculus in favor of
entering into a tax shelter was the high likelihood of avoiding detection, shelters had typically been
covered by confidentiality agreements. These agreements also protected quasi-proprietary rights, which
were important in the profitable marketing of tax shelters, given their significant development costs. See
Jeremy Kahn, The Discreet Charm of CPAs, FORTUNE, Sept. 28, 1998, at 52. After Treas. Reg. §
1.6011-4T was enacted, the practice of requiring clients to agree to confidentiality apparently
disappeared.
90 See Treas. Reg. § 301.6112-1T (2000).
91 See Treas. Reg. § 1.6011-4T (2000).
92 See ABA SECTION OF TAXATION, REPORT To AMEND 31 C.F.R. PART 10, TREASURY
DEPARTMENT CIRCULAR 230, To DEAL WITH "MORE LIKELY THAN NOT" OPINIONS RELATING TO TAX
SHELTER ITEMS OF CORPORATIONS (1999), Tax Notes Today, 1999 TNT 211-11 [hereinafter ABA TAX
SECTION 1999 CIRCULAR 230 REPORT]; Regulations Governing Practice Before the Internal Revenue
Service, 65 Fed. Reg. 30,375 (May 11, 2000) (requesting comments on whether standards for more-
likely-than-not opinions should be added to Circular 230 and standards for opinions used for marketing
tax shelters should be revised). In its final days, the Clinton Administration issued proposed regulations
incorporating due diligence requirements. See Requirements for Certain Tax Shelter Options, 31 C.F.R.
§ 10.35 (Jan. 12, 2001) ("more likely than not tax shelter opinion").
93 See, e.g., U.S. TREASURY, TREASURY'S PLAN TO COMBAT ABUSIVE TAX AVOIDANCE
TRANSACTIONS (2002), available at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/po20l8.htm.
94 See Temp. Treas. Reg. § 301.6112-1T (2002) (list maintenance); Temp. Treas. Reg. §
1.6011-4T (2002) (taxpayer disclosure requirements). The earlier versions of these regulations had
defined potentially abusive tax shelters as transactions that met two of five filters. Concluding that
taxpayers and shelter promoters were interpreting these five characteristics in "an overly narrow
manner" and the exceptions in an "overly broad manner," the Treasury expanded and clarified the six
categories of reportable transactions and eliminated various exceptions. See Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.6011 -
4T (2002). For the final regulations, see Treas. Reg. §§ 1.60114, 20.60114, 25.6011-4, 31.60114,
53.60114, 54.6011-4, 56.6011-4 (as amended in 2003) (taxpayer disclosure requirements); Treas. Reg.
§ 301.6111-2 (as amended in 2003) (registration of confidential tax shelter requirements); Treas. Reg. §
301.6112-1 (as amended in 2003) (list maintenance requirements). In 2003, the Administration also
sought legislation that would give the Treasury authority to require promoters to register the same
categories of transactions with the IRS. See Dep't of the Treasury, GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE
ADMINISTRATION'S FISCAL YEAR 2004 REVENUE PROPOSALS (2003); U.S. TREASURY, supra note 93.
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regulations that would prohibit a taxpayer from relying on a legal opinion to
satisfy the reasonable cause and good faith requirements under § 6664-4(c)
when the taxpayer had failed to disclose a reportable transaction.95 In 2003, the
Bush Treasury also proposed revisions to Circular 230, incorporating due
diligence standards for legal opinions that became final in December 2004.96
Meanwhile, Congress enacted the American Jobs Creation Act, which
contained several measures directed at tax shelters, including provisions that
strengthened the disclosure requirements, increased penalties, and eliminated
the reasonable cause exception for undisclosed transactions. 97 The statute also
reaffirmed the Treasury's authority to establish standards for written advice
pertaining to shelter transactions.
98
Throughout this process, the ABA and New York State Bar Association
("NYSBA") Tax Sections regularly offered comments on the regulatory and
legislative proposals under consideration. Both organizations, led by tax
lawyers from elite corporate firms in Washington, D.C., and New York City
respectively, have long histories of involvement in law reform activities and
function autonomously from their parent organizations.99 During the tax shelter
debates, the two groups did not always endorse the same specific
recommendations, but each supported reforms that would strengthen standards
for taxpayer disclosure to the IRS and provide incentives for tax lawyers to
play a gatekeeping function in rendering opinions.
B. The Tax Bar's Support of Increased Disclosure and Penalties
In 1999, the Clinton Treasury sought to expand the disclosures required of
corporate taxpayers and increase the penalties for substantial understatement of
taxes. The Treasury's proposal required taxpayers to disclose transactions that
met certain tax shelter characteristics on their tax returns, via a short form that
included attestation by a corporate officer with knowledge of the factual
95 See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4, 67 Fed. Reg. 79,894 (Dec. 31, 2002). In 2003, the
Administration issued final revised versions of the temporary regulations of the previous year. Treas.
Reg. § .1.6664-4 (as amended in 2003) (accuracy-related penalties).
96 See Regulations Governing Practice Before the Internal Revenue Service, 68 Fed. Reg.
75,186 (Dec. 30, 2003) (to be codified at C.F.R. pt. 10).
97 American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, §§ 811-22, 118 Stat. 1418,
1575-87 (2004).
98 31 U.S.C. § 330(d).
99 The executive committees of the ABA and NYSBA Tax Sections are mostly comprised of
partners at American Lawyer's "Top 100" law firms. See Roster for Tax Section Executive Committee,
http://www.nysba.org/MSTemplate.cfm?Template=/CustomSource/CommitteeRoster.cfm&CommitteeI
D=1539&MicrositelD=66 (last visited Dec. 3, 2005) (leadership of NYSBA Tax Section);
http://www.abanet.org/tax/leadership/officers.html (leadership of ABA Tax Section); The Am. Law 100,
http://www.law.com/special/professionals/amlaw/2003/amlawlOO/amlaw_l00main.html (last visited
Dec. 3, 2005) (American Lawyer top one hundred firms, 2001 and 2002). The ABA Tax Section has
been involved in law reform aimed at improving the federal tax system since its formation in 1939. See
James P. Holden et al., The Section of Taxation: The First Fifty Years, 44 TAx LAW. 1 (1990).
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underpinnings of the transaction. 100 The Treasury also recommended that the
substantial understatement penalty under § 6662 be raised from 20% to 40% for
reportable shelters that were not properly disclosed. 10 1 As the Treasury
emphasized, strengthened disclosure rules and penalties would greatly facilitate
detection of shelters; they would obviously also create a disincentive for
corporate taxpayers to enter into questionable transactions in the first place.' 
02
The ABA and NYSBA Tax Sections both favored an enhanced disclosure
scheme and concurred that strengthening the penalty scheme was appropriate.
In the view of the ABA Tax Section, the most troubling tax shelters depended
on questionable facts about the economics of the transaction. In particular, the
section was concerned that the purported legality of many abusive shelters
depended on dubious representations that they had a business purpose or
economic substance, or assertions of other implausible "facts" that brought
these schemes within applicable judicially created doctrines.'0 3 The Section
consequently recommended that taxpayers be required to disclose the
underlying nature and economic impact of "large" tax shelters and be subject to
separate penalties for nondisclosure that applied regardless of whether the
shelter was ultimately legitimate. 04 In the same vein, the NYSBA Tax Section
endorsed a disclosure scheme that would highlight a taxpayer's participation in
a tax shelter soon after the transaction had closed and again later on the
taxpayer's return. °5 The NYSBA Tax Section also strongly supported
increasing the penalty for substantial understatement of tax for undisclosed
transactions significantly above the current 20% rate. The Section emphasized
that such an increase was necessary for the penalty to act as an effective
deterrent. 
06
100 ADMINISTRATION'S 2000 REVENUE PROPOSALS, supra note 87, at 95-96; DEP'T OF THE
TREASURY, GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S FISCAL YEAR 2001 REVENUE
PROPOSALS, (2000), at 122-23 [hereinafter ADMINISTRATION'S 2001 REVENUE PROPOSALS]; WHITE
PAPER, supra note 24, at 79-84.
101 ADMINISTRATION'S 2000 REVENUE PROPOSALS, supra note 87, at 95. A related proposal
made at the time, discussed infra notes 137-138 and accompanying text, was to eliminate the reasonable
cause defense to penalties for substantial understatements of tax due to tax shelters. In 2000, the
Treasury proposed an additional penalty for violations of disclosure requirements. See
ADMINISTRATION'S 2001 REVENUE PROPOSALS, supra note 100, at 123-24.
102 WHITE PAPER, supra note 24, at 79. During the same period, the Treasury enacted
temporary regulations broadening the tax shelter registration and list keeping requirements, imposing
parallel disclosure obligations on shelter promoters. See supra notes 90-91 and accompanying text.
103 Tucker Statement A, supra note 83, para. 29-39.
104 Sax Statement A, supra note 83, para. 13-14. The Section proposed that a "large" tax
shelter be defined as a tax shelter under § 6662(d)(2)(c )(iii) that involved more than $10 million of tax
benefits in which the potential business or economic benefit is immaterial or insignificant in relation to
the tax benefit that might result to the taxpayer from the transaction." Id. at para. 18. The Section urged
that the required disclosure include a description of the due diligence performed to ascertain the
accuracy of the facts underlying the transaction. Id at para. 13. The Section opposed raising the penalty
for corporate tax shelters above 20%. Letter from Paul J. Sax, Chair, ABA Tax Section, to Hon. Daniel
Patrick Moynihan, U.S. Senator (June 22, 2000), Tax Notes Today, 2000 TNT 127-19.
105 See NYSBA 1999A COMMENTS, supra note 24, at 894.
106 Id. at 897.
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Given that many tax lawyers had been earning large amounts of money
facilitating their clients' participation in tax shelters, how should the bar's
support of an enhanced disclosure and penalty regime for taxpayers be
understood? It is difficult to explain by reference to short-term economic self-
interest. Additional disclosure requirements are likely to generate new business
for tax professionals, but it is tax accountants who assist in disclosure
compliance, not tax lawyers. One might argue that tax lawyers will profit from
new disclosure rules because they will be called upon to interpret the new
requirements for their clients. But lawyers would enjoy this benefit regardless
of the form that new tax shelter rules took, and new regulations appeared
inevitable under any scenario.
Strengthened disclosure requirements and higher penalties for violations,
moreover, are antithetical to the interests of clients. Presumably, they prefer the
freedom to engage in aggressive tax planning without the risk of discovery and
higher penalties. As it turned out, it was the American Institute of Certified
Public Accountants ("AICPA"), the leading representative of accountants in the
United States, and not the organized tax bar, that took up the cause of clients on
this issue. The organization, which is led by representatives of big accounting
firms, accepted the need for additional disclosure, but forcefully objected to
any increase in penalty, repeatedly citing a taxpayer's "right" to minimize taxes
by legal means. 107 Indeed, the AICPA initially went further, arguing that
penalties should be eliminated completely when a taxpayer fully disclosed
participation in a tax shelter, even if the tax shelter was subsequently
disallowed. 1
08
The organized bar's proposals also appear to be more than a gesture
intended to shore up its image. In its positions, the bar went beyond
anticipating regulation that was arguably inevitable and offered specific
proposals that would make the new regime effective. Both Sections made
suggestions about the substance, form, and timing of the required disclosure
107 See Revenue Provisions in President's Fiscal Year 2000 Budget: Hearing Before the
Senate Finance Comm., 106th Cong. (1999) (Statement of David A. Lifson for the Tax Division of the
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants), Tax Notes Today, 1999 TNT 81-27.
108 Id. at para. 99. Had it been adopted, the AICPA's approach would have failed to have any
deterrent effect. Simply put, a taxpayer would suffer no downside from engaging in an abusive tax
shelter, so long as it was disclosed. At most, a taxpayer that disclosed a tax shelter that was subsequently
determined to be abusive would be liable for taxes and accrued interest on the taxes due. When the
IRS's willingness to settle at less than full value is considered, a taxpayer's calculus would tip in favor
of participating in abusive tax shelters while simultaneously disclosing them. The AICPA later retreated
from this position and supported the imposition of additional penalties for failure to disclose a reportable
transaction. Letter from Barry Melancon & Robert Zarzar, CEO of AICPA and Chair, AICPA Tax
Ececutive Committee, to AICPA Members (Mar. 24, 2003) (on file with author). Despite the fact that
disclosure requirements generally produce business for tax accountants, the AICPA's support for
increasing such requirements has historically been lukewarm. In 1997, for example, it objected to
legislation, subsequently enacted as I.R.C. § 6111 (d), requiring the registration of confidential corporate
tax shelters. AM. INST. OF CERTIFIED PuB. ACCTS., COMMENTS ON 1997 BUDGET/TAX LEGISLATIVE
INITIATIVES para. 109-11 (1997), Tax Notes Today, 97 TNT 111-39.
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that would facilitate the IRS's detection of questionable transactions.! ° 9 The bar
also argued for increasing penalties. The ABA Tax Section advocated separate
disclosure penalties,110 while the NYSBA Tax Section promoted increased
understatement penalties for undisclosed transactions. I
1I
It is unlikely that the organized bar offered its particular proposals as a
hollow public relations ploy that it believed would never be enacted. Some
form of regulation and legislation was highly probable, and, in the end,
Congress imposed disclosure requirements on taxpayers that were very similar
to those proposed by the tax bar. Under the American Jobs Creation Act of
2004, a taxpayer faces penalties for failure to disclose a reportable transaction
regardless of whether or not the transaction results in an understatement of
tax. 112 In addition, a taxpayer that has failed to disclose a reportable transaction
that results in a substantial understatement of tax also faces a 30% strict
liability penalty."13
C. The ABA Tax Section 's Successful Efforts To Amend Circular 230
Although the ABA Tax Section supported changing the incentives of
taxpayers tempted to engage in abusive transactions, most of its energy went to
persuading the Treasury to adopt due diligence standards for opinions rendered
by lawyers to abate possible substantial understatement penalties under §§ 6662
109 Sax Statement A, supra note 83 (proposing clear specific reporting); Tucker Statement A,
supra note 83 (same); See NYSBA 1999A COMMENTS, supra note 24, at 894 (suggesting short form
filing within thirty days of transaction).
110 Sax Statement A, supra note 83; Tucker Statement A, supra note 83.
111 See NYSBA 1999A COMMENTS, supra note 24, at 897. Under the final rules issued by the
Bush Administration, taxpayers are required to disclose transactions that meet one of six criteria on their
tax returns. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.6011-4, 20.6011-4, 25.6011-4, 31.6011-4, 53.6011-4, 54.6011-4, 56.6011-4
(collected at 68 Fed. Reg. 10,161 (Mar. 4, 2003)). The six types of reportable transactions defined by the
regulations were listed transactions, confidential transactions, transactions with contractual protection,
certain loss transactions, transactions with a significant book-tax difference, and transactions involving a
brief asset holding period. 68 Fed. Reg. at 10,163-64. Under the new regulations, for example,
corporations must now report transactions that produce or are expected to produce a loss in excess of
$10 million in a year or $20 million in total. See id. Under the book-tax difference provision, certain
publicly traded corporations were required to report transactions that produce a book tax difference in
excess of $10 million. As of 2003 no separate penalty attached to the failure to disclose a reportable
transaction-prior to 2004, such a penalty was beyond the Treasury's statutory authority-but the IRS
would consider the omission of a reportable transaction a strong indication that the taxpayer failed to act
in good faith, which would bar the penalty relief previously available pursuant to the reasonable cause
exception in section 6664(c). See Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4 (accuracy related penalties); see also supra
notes 72-76 and accompanying text (on role of opinion letters under reasonable cause exception); infra
notes 137-138 and accompanying text (on proposal to enact strict liability regime).
112 I.R.C. § 6707A (2005). The penalty varies from $10,000 for a natural person to $50,000
for another entity. I.R.C. § 6707A(b)(2) (2005). It also increases if the transaction is a transaction that
has been specifically listed as a tax avoidance transaction by the Treasury. I.R.C. § 6707A(b)(2) (2005).
The statute leaves it to the Treasury to define reportable transactions. I.R.C. § 6707A(c)(1) (2005).
Under I.R.C. § 6707A(d)(1), the IRS has limited authority to rescind the penalty if the transaction was
not a listed transaction and rescission "promote[s] compliance with the requirements of this title and
effective tax administration."
113 I.R.C. §§ 6662A(c), 6664(d)(2) (2005).
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and 6664. As its support for enforceable opinion standards suggests, the
organized tax bar sought to affirm tax lawyers' gatekeeping function, and
thereby restore lawyers' authority over their clients, which had been severely
eroded by the market forces driving the tax shelter industry.l4
Beginning in 1999, the ABA Tax Section advocated adding provisions to
Circular 230 that would require due diligence standards for more-likely-than-
not opinions.1 15 At the time, Circular 230 contained no provision specifically
addressing legal opinions written to protect clients from penalties. 1 6 Rather
than attempt to refine the more-likely-than-not standard, the Section focused on
the factual representations and legal analysis that underlay opinions, consistent
with its view that the most egregious tax shelter opinions relied on dubious
factual assumptions about the economics underlying transactions. 11 7 Although
the NYSBA Tax Section advocated a strict liability approach that would
eliminate the role of legal opinions in abating penalties altogether, it agreed on
the need to impose opinion standards if Congress did not adopt a strict liability
scheme."18
The ABA Tax Section began to enjoy some success in January 2001,
when the Clinton Administration adopted its approach and proposed due
114 See Ronald J. Gilson, The Devolution of the Legal Profession: A Demand Side
Perspective, 49 MD. L. REV. 869 (1990); John C. Coffee, Jr., The Attorney as Gatekeeper: An Agenda
for the SEC, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1293 (2003); Jill E. Fisch & Kenneth M. Rosen, Is There a Role for
Lawyers in Preventing Future Enrons?, 48 VILL. L. REV. 1097 (2003); Fred Zacharias, Lawyers as
Gatekeepers, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1387 (2004). The literature on lawyers as gatekeepers tends to
focus on how lawyers can prevent clients from engaging in wrongdoing by withholding legal assistance,
but does not consider how legal expertise may underlie this function.
115 See ABA TAX SECTION 1999 CIRCULAR 230 REPORT, supra note 92. James P. Holden, a
partner at the law firm of Steptoe & Johnson and a tax ethics authority, first proposed due diligence
standards for legal opinions in a speech to the American College of Tax Counsel in 1999. See James. P.
Holden, 1999 Erwin Griswold Lecture: Dealing with the Aggressive Corporate Tax Shelter Problem, 52
TAX LAW. 369 (1999).
116 See Circular 230, 31 C.F.R. pt. 10 (1999); Regulations Governing Practice Before the
Internal Revenue Service: Advance Notice of Proposed Rule Making, 65 Fed. Reg. 30,375 (May 11,
2000) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 10) (requesting comments as to whether standards for more-likely-
than-not opinions should be added to Circular 230 and standards for opinions used for marketing tax
shelters should be revised). Circular 230 had been revised most recently in connection with tax shelter
issues in 1984, when section 10.33, which sets out standards for opinions used to market tax shelters
publicly to third parties, was added. See Circular 230, 31 C.F.R. § 10.33 (1999). Section 10.33 tracked
Formal Opinion 346, issued by the ABA in 1982. Formal Opinion 346, supra note 77. It prohibited an
opinion writer from relying on unreasonable factual assertions, but applied only to opinions designed to
be included or described in tax shelter offering materials that were publicly distributed. See id. 31 C.F.R.
§ 10.33(a)(1), (c)(3).
117 See Tucker Statement A, supra note 83, para. 29-36. The ABA Tax Section advocated the
introduction of standards for opinion writing that would, inter alia, require lawyers to make reasonable
inquiries in connection with the factual representations made by taxpayers, address all applicable law,
including common law doctrines, and unambiguously conclude more likely than not that the tax
treatment of the item would be upheld if challenged. ABA TAX SECTION 1999 CIRCuLAR 230 REPORT,
supra note 92, at 3-4.
118 See NYSBA Tax Section, REPORT ON PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO CIRCULAR NO. 230
(July 31, 2000) para. 16-17, Tax Notes Today, 2000 TNT 150-31. For discussion of the strict liability
proposal, see infra notes 137-149 and accompanying text.
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diligence standards for opinion letters. 119 The proposed regulation applied
broadly to any written advice about the federal tax treatment of a tax shelter
transaction, defined as any entity, plan or arrangement which had as a
significant purpose tax avoidance.120 Under the rule, an author of a more-
likely-than-not opinion was required to engage in due diligence and could not
rely on unreasonable or conclusory factual assumptions. 21 In particular, the
rule prohibited a practitioner from relying solely on a client's representation
that a transaction had a business purpose or was potentially profitable.
22
Opinions were also required to relate the applicable law to the facts, analyze the
material tax law issues, and provide unambiguous conclusions about the federal
tax treatment of the transaction. 23 In December 2003, the Treasury again
issued proposed rules applicable to tax shelter opinions containing due
diligence requirements. 1
24
A fundamental problem with the Treasury's proposals, noted by the
organized tax bar and accounting profession, was that they would cover all tax
opinions and accordingly imposed onerous and expensive requirements on
routine written tax advice. Lawyer and accounting groups offered different
solutions. The ABA Tax Section took the position that the opinions subject to
the requirement should be limited to those specifically intended to provide
protection from substantial underpayment penalties under § 6662.125 Taking a
similar tack, the NYSBA Tax Section endorsed an "opt-in" rule under which
119 See 66 Fed. Reg. 3276, (Jan. 12, 2001) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. § 10.35).
120 Id. § 10.35(c)(2) (2001). The proposed rule adopted the broad definition of a tax shelter
from I.R.C. § 6662(d)(2)(C)(iii).
121 31 C.F.R. § 10.35(a)(1) (2001).
122 Id. § 10.35(a)(l)(c)(iii). The proposed rule also prohibited an opinion writer from relying
on unreasonable or uninformed financial appraisals. Id. § 10.35(a)(l)(c)(iv)-(v) (2001).
123 Id. § 10.35(a)(4) (2001). The Treasury's proposals, in addition, set forth minimal
standards of competence to render tax opinions. Id. § 10.35(b) (2001).
124 See Regulations Governing Practice Before the Internal Revenue Service, 68 Fed. Reg.
75,186 (Dec. 30, 2003) (to be codified at C.F.R. pt. 10). A month earlier, the Senate Subcommittee on
Special Investigations had held hearings on the tax shelter activities of KPMG and issued a lengthy
report. See U.S. TAX SHELTER INDUSTRY, supra note 58. One of the Permanent Subcommittee's
recommendations was that Treasury revise Circular 230 to include tax shelter opinion standards. Id.
para. 51(5).
125 See ABA SECTION OF TAXATION, COMMENTS ON PROPOSED RULEMAKING CIRCULAR 230
para. 1-35 (2004), Tax Notes Today, 2004 TNT 32-38 (suggesting that standards for tax opinions apply
only to legal advice of "a type which ordinarily addresses the final and complete form of a transaction";
alternatively, standards should apply only to opinions expressly stating that they are provided for penalty
protection). Initially, the ABA's preferred solution was that the Treasury adopt a narrow definition of
tax shelter for purposes of the due diligence requirements. See ABA SECTION OF TAXATION, COMMENTS
REGARDING PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE REGULATIONS GOVERNING PRACTICE BEFORE THE
INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE para. 41-42, 57-60 (2001), Tax Notes Today, 2001 TNT 86-47 (stating
that tax shelter definition should be limited to transactions with the principal purpose of tax avoidance;
alternatively, definition of opinion should be limited to those prepared for "stated purpose" of penalty
protection as originally suggested in 1999). Its position evolved over time. See ABA SECTION OF
TAXATION, PROPOSED REVISIONS TO CIRCULAR 230 para. 3-4 (2002), Tax Notes Today, 2002 TNT 87-
21 (arguing that tax shelter opinion standards should not apply to all advice relating to reportable
transactions under disclosure and registration rules; proposing six part filter for transactions subject to
section 10.35 opinion standards).
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the new standards would apply to opinions expressly providing penalty
protection. 126 In contrast to the tax bar, the AICPA repeatedly argued that the
definition of the underlying transactions subject to the rule should be narrowed
to those with the principal (as opposed to a significant) purpose of tax
avoidance. 1
27
With the Treasury's enactment of the ABA Tax Section's proposal in
2004, legal opinions that are offered to provide penalty protection now fall
under the jurisdiction of the IRS, which has authority to sanction lawyers for
violations. 128 Adopting the tax bar's approach, the Treasury's final rules cover
a broad range of written advice, including opinions offered in connection with
listed transactions or whose principal purpose is tax avoidance; and more-
likely-than-not and marketing opinions offered in connection with transactions
with a significant purpose of tax avoidance.129 To narrow its potential scope,
the rule includes an "opt-out" provision, under which a more-likely-than-not
opinion is covered unless its author prominently discloses that the advice is not
intended to be used to avoid penalties.' 30 Along the lines originally proposed by
126 See N.Y. STATE BAR ASS'N TAX SECTION, REPORT ON PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO
CIRCULAR No. 230 para. 3 (2000), Tax Notes Today, 2000 TNT 150-31 (recommending that "a
reasonable cause opinion should state that it is being provided for that purpose"). Although it briefly
favored an "opt-out" rule under which only written opinions that made clear that they were not intended
for penalty relief would be exempt from the shelter opinion standards, N.Y. STATE BAR ASS'N TAX
SECTION, REPORT 995 ON PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO CIRCULAR NO. 230 para. 32-35 (2001), Tax
Notes Today, TNT-149-41 [hereinafter NYSBA Tax Section January 2001 Report] (favoring "opt-out"
provision), it has most recently reverted to its original position in favor of an "opt-in" provision. See
N.Y. STATE BAR ASS'N TAX SECTION, REPORT ON PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO CIRCULAR 230, at 7-8
(Mar. 24, 2004), Tax Notes Today, 2004 TNT 58-46 (favoring "opt-in" provision). As of 2004, a
sizeable minority of the section still believed that an opt-out approach was preferable. Id.
127 See AM. INST. OF CERTIFIED PUB. ACCOUNTANTS, COMMENTS ON ADVANCE NOTICE OF
PROPOSED RULEMAKING TO AMEND THE REGULATIONS GOVERNING PRACTICE BEFORE THE INTERNAL
REVENUE SERVICE CONTAINED IN CIRCULAR NO. 230, at 4 (2000), Tax Notes Today, 2000 TNT 140-16
(supporting standards for opinions on transactions about which the practitioner "knew or should have
known" that the principal purpose was tax avoidance or evasion); AM. INST. OF CERTIFIED PUB.
ACCOUNTANTS, COMMENTS ON PROPOSED MODIFICATIONS OF THE REGULATIONS GOVERNING
PRACTICE BEFORE THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, WHICH APPEAR IN THE CODE OF FEDERAL
REGULATIONS AND IN PAMPHLET FORM AS TREASURY DEPARTMENT CIRCULAR NO. 230 para. 59-63
(2001), Tax Notes Today, 2001 TNT 82-34 (designation of tax shelter for purposes of sections 10.33
and 10.35 should be determined by reference to "the principal purpose" definition); AM. INST. OF
CERTIFIED PUB. ACCOUNTANTS, SUPPLEMENTAL COMMENTS ON REG-1 1835-99, PROPOSED
AMENDMENTS TO CIRCULAR 230 para. 5-6 (2002), Tax Notes Today, 2002 TNT 33-72 (tax shelter
should be defined by reference to the "principal purpose" standard or by reference to business purpose
or economic substance of transaction); AM. INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED PUB. ACCOUNTANTS, COMMENTS
ON PROPOSED REGULATIONS, REG. 122379-02 para. 14 (2004), Tax Notes Today, 2004 TNT 32-39 ("a
significant purpose" definition of proposed regulations overly broad).
128 Prior to 2004, the Treasury had authority to suspend or disbar from practice before it a
practitioner who violated Circular 230. The American Jobs Creation Act gave the Treasury authority to
impose monetary penalties as well. 31 U.S.C. § 330(b).
129 31 C.F.R. § 10.35 (b)(2)(C) (2005). Covered opinions also included opinions offered
under conditions of confidentiality or under contractual protection. Id.
130 31 C.F.R. § 10.35(c)(3)(v)(3) (2005). The rule also prohibits an opinion writer from
relying on a projection, financial forecast, or appraisal, if the practitioners knows or should know that it
is incorrect, incomplete or prepared by an unqualified person. Id. § 10.35(c)(1).
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the ABA Tax Section, the final rule requires opinion writers to make
reasonable inquiries into the underlying facts of transactions and prohibits them
from relying on unreasonable factual assumptions or representations. Opinion
authors must also relate applicable law to the facts, evaluate all significant
federal tax issues, and provide an overall conclusion as to the appropriate tax
treatment of the transactions.131
The tax bar's five year campaign in favor of due diligence requirements is
difficult to explain based on the conventional views of bar activities. Due
diligence obligations do not further either the bar's interests or those of its
clients. For clients, a regime that permits them to obtain opinion letters from
lawyers based solely on representations that transactions have economic
substance is clearly preferable to one in which lawyers must satisfy themselves
that transactions do in fact have economic substance before issuing opinions.
One might argue that due diligence requirements will benefit lawyers by
increasing the price of legal opinions. Due diligence takes time, which costs
money. The tax bar, however, did not seek broad application of due diligence
requirements to encompass routine tax advice. To the contrary, it insisted that
the requirement cover only opinions provided in connection with tax
shelters.
132
In addition, the increase in fees from due diligence in connection with
covered opinions may be offset by the numerous occasions in which clients will
be deterred at the outset from engaging in transactions that have no business
Treasury's choice of an "opt-out" approach provoked a strong reaction from the bar because it
entailed placing detailed legends that had to be "prominently displayed" on all written tax advice. See
Letter from David P. Hariton, Chairman, N.Y. State Bar Association, to Eric Solomon, Acting Deputy
Assistant Secretary, Department of the Treasury, and Mark W. Everson, Commissioner, Internal
Revenue Service (Mar. 5, 2005), Tax Notes Today, 2005 TNT 43-56 (noting that members had
reconsidered and were now unanimous in supporting opt-in approach; urging Treasury to adopt same);
Letter from Kenneth W. Gideon to Arnold I. Havens, General Counsel, Department of the Treasury
(May 11, 2005) (on file with author) (urging Treasury to adopt opt-in approach). Although the Treasury
continued with an opt-out approach in subsequent regulations, it loosened the definition of "prominently
displayed" and excluded several categories of advice from the rule's definition of "covered opinion."
See 31 C.F.R. §§ 10.35(b)(2)(ii)(A)-(E), 10.35(b)(8) (2005). Although individual tax practitioners
continued to raise concerns, see Letter from Mark E. Berg, Chair, NYSBA Tax Section, to Mark W.
Everson, Commissioner, Internal Revenue Service, and others (June 28, 2005), Tax Notes Today, 2005
TNT 125-12, the outcry appears to have died out as tax lawyers have developed routine legends, similar
to the confidentiality banners that accompany correspondence from law firms, that they include in all tax
advice. See Sheryl Stratton, Circular 230 E-Mails, T-Shirts Attain 'Legendary' Status (July 5, 2005),
Tax Notes Today, 2005 TNT 127-1.
The final rules adopted by the Treasury did not provide an opt-out option for opinions relating to
transactions whose "principal purpose" was tax avoidance. See 31 C.F.R. §§ 10.35(b)(2)(i)(B),
(c)(3)(v)(2) (2005). In response to the tax bar's concern that transactions with a principal purpose of tax
avoidance were often contemplated by the Code, see Letter from David P. Hariton to Eric Solomon and
Mark W. Everson, supra, Letter from Kenneth W. Gideon to Arnold I. Havens, supra, Treasury clarified
the definition of "principal purpose" to exclude transactions that claimed tax benefits consistent with
Congressional purpose. See 31 C.F.R. § 10.35(b)(10) (2005).
131 31 C.F.R. § 10.35(b)(4)(ii) (2005).
132 See Letter from David P. Hariton to Eric Solomon and Mark W. Everson, supra note 130;
Letter from Kenneth W. Gideon to Arnold I. Havens, supra note 130.
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purpose or economic substance. Tax practices that earned hundreds of millions
of dollars issuing boilerplate opinions on abusive transactions are likely to
disappear, as it is doubtful that the fees lawyers in these firms can make from
additional due diligence would compensate for the lost earnings.
1 33
A skeptic might still argue that the bar's support of due diligence
requirements is a type of rent-seeking by the "ethical" segment of the bar to
recapture the market for opinions it had lost to practitioners willing to provide
opinions on abusive transactions. As an explanation, however, the rent-seeking
hypothesis is not very helpful. From the perspective of maximizing financial
self-interest, it made more sense for ethical lawyers to abandon their qualms
and join their less ethical counterparts who were earning substantial incomes
from their opinion practices, rather than go through the lengthy exercise of
seeking the imposition of more stringent requirements. That leaders of the tax
bar failed to take this route suggests that they had a stake in restoring ethics
standards in opinion letters. An economic maximization model does not
adequately explain this stake.' 
34
To understand the stakes involved, it is necessary to explore how due
diligence obligations alter tax lawyers' relationships with government and
clients. In persuading the Treasury to adopt a due diligence requirement where
previously there was none, the tax bar departed from the legal profession's
traditional conception of professional independence. Under this conception,
lawyers exercise discretionary expert judgments free from client or
governmental interference.' 35 In supporting due diligence, the tax bar
recognized that lawyers' authority over their clients had been significantly
eroded by the tax shelter market. To reclaim this authority, lawyers have to
relinquish an important dimension of discretionary judgment to the state. With
the due diligence requirement, lawyers can no longer decide for themselves
how far to probe into their clients' representations. By enlisting the Treasury as
an outside regulatory authority, the tax bar acknowledged that whatever norms
of professional independence once underlay the application of tax expertise,
these norms alone can no longer counteract the distorting effects of market
forces.
Even as the rule supported by the tax bar cedes authority to the IRS, it
strengthens the independence of tax advisers vis-A-vis their clients. Because
opinion writers will be subject to sanctions in connection with a broad class of
transactions, these lawyers will have to insist that clients provide a reasonable
business rationale before issuing an opinion that offers penalty protection for a
transaction. By delegating to tax advisers the function of policing the economic
133 See supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text.
134 Nor can the bar's support of due diligence be dismissed as an empty gesture intended to
improve the tax bar's image. It was, after all, an initiative that originated with the organized bar and that
will have significant consequences for tax opinion practice.
135 See Robert W. Gordon, The Independence ofLawyers, 68 B.U.L. REv. 1,6(1988).
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basis of their clients' transactions, moreover, due diligence obligations deter
clients from engaging in the most aggressive transactions.
D. The NYSBA Tax Section's Endorsement of a Strict Liability Regime
While supporting the ABA Tax Section's push for due diligence
standards, the NYSBA Tax Section favored a more extreme makeover, arguing
for a shift to strict liability for taxpayers who engaged in tax shelters that
resulted in substantial understatements of tax. Just as the ABA Tax Section's
support of due diligence is difficult to square with pure self-interest, so is the
NYSBA Tax Section's advocacy of strict liability. Like the due diligence
requirement, strict liability attempts to reaffirm the authority of lawyers over
their clients, but does so indirectly, through market competition. Whereas due
diligence works by altering the incentives for lawyers, which in turn alter the
incentives for clients, a strict liability strategy affects incentives in the other
direction. Strict liability neutralizes the protective effects of legal opinions,
thereby putting the burden of avoiding abusive tax shelters squarely on
taxpayers, who will be induced to seek out legal advice that is knowledgeable
and conservative.
In its Fiscal Year 2000 Revenue Proposals, the Clinton Administration
proposed that Congress abolish the "reasonable cause" exception for accuracy-
related penalties for transactions attributable to corporate tax shelters.1 36 Under
this proposal, a corporate taxpayer would no longer be able to avoid the penalty
for a substantial understatement of income tax due to a corporate tax shelter by
claiming that it had relied on the advice of counsel. The Administration also
proposed to increase the substantial understatement penalty to 40%, calculated
based on the amount of the understatement, if the taxpayer failed to disclose the
tax shelter, as required under the proposed legislation. If the taxpayer disclosed
the shelter, the penalty would remain at 20%. 137
The NYSBA Tax Section embraced this approach, calling it a "radical"
reform that would alter the calculus of corporate taxpayers deciding whether to
engage in tax shelters.1 38 As the Tax Section noted, the substantial
136 See ADMINISTRATION'S 2000 REVENUE PROPOSALS, supra note 87, at 95.
137 See id. at 95. In the following year, the Administration modified this proposal so that strict
liability would apply only to undisclosed corporate tax shelters. For shelters that were disclosed, a
taxpayer could obtain abatement of the 20% penalty under a strengthened reasonable cause exception.
See ADMINISTRATION'S 2001 REVENUE PROPOSALS, supra note 100, at 124.
138 See NYSBA 1999A COMMENTS, supra note 24, at 891-94. The ABA Tax Section has been
concerned broadly about removing the Service's authority to waive penalties in appropriate
circumstances, see Penalty and Interest Provisions in the Internal Revenue Code: Hearing Before the H.
Subcomm. on Oversight of the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 106th Cong. 14 (1999) (statement of
Pamela F. Olson, Chair-Elect, American Bar Association Section on Taxation). The AICPA has strongly
opposed a strict liability approach. See, e.g., Revenue Raising Proposals in the Administration's Fiscal
Year 2000 Budget: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Finance, 106th Cong. (1999) (statement of David




understatement penalties would now have meaningful deterrent effect. A
taxpayer who engaged in an abusive transaction would run a real risk of facing
a substantial penalty.
While acknowledging the traditional principle that clients are entitled to
rely on advice of counsel, the NYSBA Tax Section recognized that the
conditions on which it was premised-a client consulting a lawyer in good faith
to determine its legal liabilities--did not hold. 139 As the section noted, the tax
"dialogue" between lawyer and client had become distorted, focusing on
whether a lawyer would render an opinion rather than on the underlying merits
of the transaction. 14 In the NYSBA Tax Section's view, an important benefit
of strict liability would be to restore the importance of well-reasoned tax advice
in client decision-making.' 4' Strict liability would alter the incentives for
seeking legal advice, which would, in turn, alter the advice that was given.
Since clients would be unable to purchase penalty protection, they would seek
the best legal advice, which lawyers would be motivated to provide. By
creating a market for well-reasoned legal advice that addressed the legal merits
of a transaction, a strict liability regime would strengthen lawyers' capacity to
dissuade clients from entering into abusive tax shelter transactions. 1
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Although not mentioned by the NYSBA Tax Section, a shift to strict
liability would also render tax lawyers more vulnerable to malpractice claims,
particularly by corporate clients. Under the previous regime, a corporate client
would have had difficulty proving that it relied on a lawyer's advice in entering
into the transaction, having obtained the lawyer's opinion for penalty protection
only. 143 Under strict liability, a taxpayer is motivated to consult a tax adviser to
obtain substantive legal guidance. If the lawyer's advice turns out to be wrong
139 NYSBA 1999A COMMENTS, supra note 24, at 892. Professor Calvin Johnson argued that
"giving a corporation an immunity from penalty if it has a reasonable basis or substantial authority for
its reporting position will mean that the corporation will not try hard enough to predict real outcomes of
the case.... [It] is a bit like scoring football games by the number of good tries or reasonable efforts.
Scoring by touchdowns accomplished seems to encourage each side to try harder." Calvin H. Johnson,
Corporate Tax Shelters, 1997 and 1998, 80 TAx NOTES 1603, 1606 (Sept. 28, 1998).
140 See NYSBA 1999A COMMENTS, supra note 24, at 893.
141 Id.
142 Id. The NYSBA Tax Section has taken the position that it favors strict liability for
purposes of the substantial understatement penalty but not for "mere disclosure" failures. See Letter
from Andrew N. Berg, Chair, Chair, NYSBA Tax Section, to Hon. Charles E. Grassley & Hon. Max
Baucus, Senate Finance Committee (Oct. 22, 2003), available at http://www.nysba.org. Disclosure
provisions are intentionally over-inclusive, covering a broad swath of transactions with the
characteristics of tax shelters, many of which will turn out to be legitimate transactions. In the Tax
Section's view, a taxpayer who inadvertently fails to disclose a non-tax motivated transaction that falls
within one of the categories of reportable transactions should be able to invoke the reasonable cause
exception. Strict liability should apply, on the other hand, when the taxpayer would lose on the
underlying merits of the transaction. See Letter from Andrew N. Berg, Chair, NYSBA Tax Section, to
Hon. William M. Thomas, Chair, House Ways & Means Committee (Sept. 24, 2003), available at
http://www.nysba.org; accord N.Y. STATE BAR ASS'N TAX SECTION, REPORT ON RECENT TAX SHELTER
REGULATIONS 1025 (2003) at 20-21, available at http://www.nysba.org.
143 See supra notes 74-76 and accompanying text.
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on the merits, a taxpayer will have a greater likelihood of success in a
subsequent malpractice action.
The NYSBA Tax Section's approach is reflected in the American Jobs
Creation Act of 2004, which abolishes penalty protection for opinion letters in
connection with reportable tax shelters that are not properly disclosed and are
later found to be abusive. 144 Taxpayers who fail to disclose such transactions
can no longer avail themselves of the reasonable cause exception under § 6664
and are subject to a 30% penalty.145 Taxpayers who properly disclose reportable
transactions that turn out to be abusive continue to be subject to a 20% penalty,
which they can avoid under a more stringent reasonable cause exception.
Taxpayers can avoid the penalty if they can establish that they had substantial
authority for the claimed tax treatment and reasonably believed that the claimed
tax treatment was more likely than not the proper tax treatment at the time the
return was filed.
146
As with due diligence, economic self-interest does not satisfactorily
explain the NYSBA Tax Section's support of strict liability. Such a regime is
certainly not in the interests of clients who can no longer avoid penalties by
claiming that they relied on their lawyer's advice. Nor can the bar's support be
construed as purely symbolic: The shift to strict liability will have a dramatic
effect on opinion practices. Such a regime, moreover, does not maximize
individual lawyers' economic interests. As noted above, tax lawyers are able to
make more money when letters provide penalty protection.
147
Strict liability, like due diligence, reinforces tax lawyers' authority over
their clients. Placing the risk of error on taxpayers creates a market for
knowledgeable and cautious opinions. As the NYSBA Tax Section
144 The Bush Administration sought to impose strict liability through administrative
measures. See TREASURY'S PLAN To COMBAT ABUSIVE TAX AVOIDANCE TRANSACTIONS, supra note
93; Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4(c)(2), 67 Fed. Reg. 79,894 (Dec. 2002). After its regulatory authority
to abolish the reasonable cause exception came under doubt, see, e.g., Letter from Samuel J. Dimon to
Pamela F. Olson and Hon. Charles Rossotti (May 22, 2002) (on file with author), the Treasury adopted a
different strategy, suggested by the NYSBA Tax Section, that tied the failure to disclose to the issue of
whether the taxpayer acted in good faith for purposes of meeting the reasonable cause exception. Under
the Treasury's final rule, enacted in 2003, failure to disclose a reportable transaction was a "strong
indication that the taxpayer did not act in good faith" for purposes of the accuracy-related penalty. See
Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4; cf. NYSBA TAX SECTION, COMMENTS ON THE NEW TAX SHELTER
REGULATIONS (Nov. 16, 2000), Tax Notes Today, 2000 TNT 44-86 (arguing that the failure to disclose
reportable tax shelter should give rise to "rebuttable presumption" that taxpayer did not act in good faith
for purpose of applying reasonable cause exception).
145 I.R.C. §§ 6664(c), 6662A(c) (2005); cf. NYSBA 1999A COMMENTS, supra note 24.
146 I.R.C. § 6664(d)(2)(B)-(C) (2005). The new statute also requires that any opinion relied
upon by a taxpayer to establish reasonable belief be from an advisor who does not derive significant
income from designing or marketing the transaction at issue and not contain unreasonable factual or
legal assumptions or representations. I.R.C. § 6664(3)(B) (2005).
147 Like the organized bar's support of due diligence, the NYSBA Tax Section's support of
strict liability could be argued to be a form of rent seeking, but this view again leaves unexplained the




emphasized, with strict liability, "a greater premium will be placed on receiving
the most thoughtful and accurate legal advice, not the most aggressive.,
148
E. The Tax Bar's Resistance to Codifying the Economic Substance Doctrine
In contrast to its support for most of the major governmental initiatives
targeted at abusive tax shelters, the organized bar has expressed strong
opposition to the proposal, raised intermittently since the late 1990s, to codify
the economic substance doctrine. One of the more controversial strategies
targeted at corporate tax shelters, the proposal initially appeared in the Clinton
Administration's 1999 proposals. 149  At first receptive to the idea of
codification, the Bush Administration eventually decided against pursuing it.
150
Despite this lack of enthusiasm, proposals to codify the economic substance
doctrine have surfaced recently in several bills pending before Congress.' 51 The
organized tax bar has based its resistance on the argument that a statutory
formulation would supplant and confuse existing judicially created doctrines.
In its 2000 Fiscal Year Revenue Proposal, the Clinton Administration
proposed broadening Internal Revenue Code § 269, a provision that authorizes
the IRS to disallow tax benefits from certain acquisitions whose principal
purpose is the evasion or avoidance of federal income tax. The proposal would
have permitted the IRS to deny benefits in "tax avoidance" transactions.1 52 The
148 See NYSBA 1999A COMMENTS, supra note 24, at 893.
149 See ADMINISTRATION'S 2000 REVENUE PROPOSALS, supra note 87, at 97-98;
ADMINISTRATION'S 2001 REVENUE PROPOSALS, supra note 100, at 124-26. For the debate, see, e.g.,
David P. Hariton, Economic Substance Complaint No. 1: "Too Vague and Too Broad, " 96 TAX NOTES
1893 (Sept. 30, 2002), Tax Notes Today, 2002 TNT 190-30; David P. Hariton, How To Fix Economic
Substance, 99 TAX NOTES 539 (Apr. 28, 2003), Tax Notes Today, 2003 TNT 82-33 [hereinafter
Economic Substance]; James M. Peaslee, Economic Substance Codification Gets Worse, 99 TAX NOTES
1101 (May 19, 2003), Tax Notes Today, 2003 TNT 97-28; Samuel C. Thompson Jr. & Robert Allen
Clary II, Coming in from the "Cold": The Case for ESD Codification, Tax Notes Today, 2003 TNT
102-33; Monte A. Jackel, For Better or for Worse: Codification of Economic Substance, Tax Notes
Today, 2004 TNT 96-33; Mark J. Silverman, et. al, The Case Against Economic Substance Codification,
104 TAX NOTES 314 (July 19, 2004), Tax Notes Today, 2004 TNT 139-43.
150 Compare Warren Rojas, Bush's 2003 Budget Offers Leftover Tax Cuts and Brand New
Ideas, Tax Notes Today, 2002 TNT 24-1 (administration considering economic substance doctrine) with
Sheryl Stratton, Shelter Disclosure, Doctrine Codification Debated, Tax Notes Today, 2003 TNT 61-3
(Treasury against codifying economic substance doctrine).
151 See, e.g., CARE Act of 2003, S.476, 108th Cong. § 701 (2003); Jobs and Growth Tax
Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, H.R.2, 108th Cong. § 301 (2003); Rebuild America Act of 2003, S.
1409, 108th Cong. § 1101 (2003); Tax Shelter Transparency and Enforcement Act, S.1937, 108th Cong.
(2003); Jumpstart our Business Strength Act, 108th Cong. § 401 (2004) (Senate Amendment No.
2647); Tax Shelter and Tax Haven Reform Act, 108th Cong. §§ 301, 303 (2004). Although the
American Jobs Creation Act did not codify the economic substance doctrine, in 2005 Congress was still
considering the proposal. See Sheryl Stratton, Government, Practitioners Look at Attacking Tax Shelters
from Both Sides, Tax Notes Today, 2005 TNT 189-3.
152 See ADMINISTRATION'S 2000 REVENUE PROPOSALS, supra note 87, at 97-98. "Tax
avoidance" transactions were defined as transactions in which the reasonably pre-tax profit of the
transaction (determined on a present value basis) is insignificant compared to the tax benefits achieved
in the transaction. The proposal also anticipated that it would also cover "certain transactions involving
the improper elimination or significant reduction of tax on economic income." Id. at 96.
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NYSBA Tax Section objected on the grounds that it greatly expanded the
power of the IRS without providing sufficient guidance. According to the
section, granting such broad authority to the Service without direction from
Congress, in the form of "substantial legislative background and history,"
created "significant potential for mischief.' '153 Such a broad provision,
furthermore, gave little guidance to taxpayers as to what sorts of transactions
would be disallowed, undercutting any deterrence value of the provision.
154
The Section's most serious concern, however, was that the proposal put at
risk the judicially created doctrines that had developed to curb abusive
transactions. In the Section's view, a "super-section 269" could interfere with
the development of law in this area by supplanting current law and requiring
the development of new law to make "the required, highly nuanced distinctions
between transactions." 155 The Section emphasized that "[it] could be self-
defeating if a super-section 269 provision replaced such law and, in effect, a
body of interpretative cases had to develop anew to address corporate tax
planning.'
156
When the Treasury recast the proposal as a "codification" of the economic
substance doctrine the following year,' 57 the Section reasserted its faith in
judicial doctrines over codification. According to the Section, economic
substance could not be formulated as a statutory rule. 158 The Section "did not
think it possible... to devise a sequence of abstract words that distinguishes
abusive tax-motivated transactions from other transactions."' 59 As the Section
observed, the doctrine is fundamentally a doctrine of statutory interpretation
founded on a purposive view of the Code. The first and foremost issue in
applying the doctrine, consequently, is whether the taxpayer is seeking tax
benefits under circumstances in which Congress did not intend for such
benefits to be available. If the tax results were of the sort contemplated by
Congress, then the transaction would not be deemed abusive. According to the
153 See NYSBA 1999A COMMENTS, supra note 24, at 898.
154 Id.
155 Id. at 899.
156 Id. The Section suggested other possible approaches, including a strategy that singled out
certain classes of transactions, such as the loss generator at issue in the ACMcase. Id. at 899-900.
157 See ADMINISTRATION'S 2001 REvENUE PROPOSALS, supra note 100, at 126. Under the
Treasury's proposal the tax benefits from transactions were to be disallowed if the "reasonably expected
pre-tax profit" was insignificant relative to "the reasonably expected tax benefits." Id. In financing
transactions, tax benefits would be disallowed if the present value of the tax benefits to the taxpayer to
whom the financing was provided were significantly in excess of the value of the pre-tax profit or return
of the person providing the financing. Id.
158 See N.Y. STATE BAR ASS'N, TREASURY'S PROPOSAL To CODIFY THE ECONOMIC
SUBSTANCE DOCTRINE (2000), Tax Notes Today, 2000 TNT 146-25 [hereinafter N.Y. STATE BAR
ASS'N TAX SECTION 2000 REPORT]. David P. Hariton was the principal drafter of this report. In its
comments, the Section emphasized that it did not have a consensus in favor of codification. Nor,
apparently, did it have a consensus against. Some members believed that a more narrow substantive
disallowance rule would be helpful, others supported a broader rule, and a third group was opposed to
any form of codification. Id. at 938.
159 Id. at 939.
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section, this inquiry is based on considerations that cannot be translated into a
broad objective formula, but depend on the facts of the case and the particular
statutory provision at issue. 160 The Section insisted that if the Treasury decided
to pursue codification, congressional purpose needed to be incorporated into
the statute. 
16 1
The NYSBA Tax Section has sounded a similar refrain in response to
subsequent congressional proposals to codify the doctrine, which seek to
improve on the Clinton Administration's first attempts' 62 In the most current
version, a court will disallow a transaction for lack of economic substance if the
court determines that the doctrine is "relevant" to a transaction unless a
taxpayer can establish that: first, the transaction changes in a meaningful way
(apart from federal tax effects) the taxpayer's economic position; second, the
taxpayer has a substantial non-tax reason for entering into the transaction; and,
third, the transaction is a reasonable means of accomplishing that purpose. 163 If
a transaction is disallowed, the taxpayer faces penalties that vary depending on
whether the transaction has been properly disclosed. 164  According to
Congressional proponents, the purpose of this legislation is "to clarify for the
courts the appropriate standards to use in determining whether a transaction has
economic substance."' 65 In particular, codification would eliminate the
apparent lack of uniformity among courts as to whether a conjunctive test-
requiring economic substance and business purpose-or a disjunctive test-
under which one or the other might be sufficient-is applied.' 66 Codifying the
doctrine would also clarify that in transactions that a taxpayer claims are profit
driven, the profit must be more than nominal.
167
160 Id. at 938.
161 Id. at 946. Mr. Hariton has subsequently proposed such an approach; see Economic
Substance, supra note 149. The NYSBA also objected to the specific formulation offered by the
Treasury in 2000. N.Y. STATE BAR ASS'N TAX SECTION 2000 REPORT, supra note 159, at 942-45. While
strongly disfavoring codification, the Section offered several alternatives, which it argued fit more
closely the economic substance doctrine. Id. at 946.
162 See, e.g., CARE Act; Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act; Rebuild America
Act; Tax Shelter Transparency and Enforcement Act, Jumpstart our Business Strength Act, Tax Shelter
and Tax Haven Reform Act.
163 See, e.g., CARE Act § 701(m)(1)(B)(i)(I); Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act
§ 301; Jumpstart Our Business Strength Act §§ 401,404; Tax Shelter and Tax Haven Reform Act § 301.
When a taxpayer relies on profit potential to establish economic substance, it must show that the present
value of the reasonably expected pre-tax profit from the transaction is substantial in relation to the
present value of the expected tax benefits and the reasonably expected pre-tax profit exceeds a risk-free
rate of return. Fees and foreign taxes, for purposes of determining pre-tax profit, are treated as expenses.
164 See, e.g., CARE Act § 662B; Tax Shelter and Tax Haven Reform Act § 303.
165 S. REP. NO. 108-11, at 78 (2003).
166 Id. Under the ABA Tax Section's position, the case law does not contain inconsistent
approaches. Courts have required either business purpose or economic substance, unless the Code
provision expressly required business purpose in addition to economic substance. See Letter from
Herbert N. Beller, ABA Tax Section, to Hon. Charles E. Grassley & Hon. Max Baucus, Senate Finance
Committee, (April 23, 2003), Tax Notes Today, 2003 TNT 81-74.
167 Id. The bill rejected the approach taken in the Toyota World, Compaq, and IES Industries
cases, which required an objective determination of whether a reasonable possibility of pre-tax profit
existed apart from tax benefits. See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 108TH CONG., DESCRIPTION
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Despite these attempts to refine the approach, the NYSBA Tax Section
remained unconvinced. In response to one proposal in 2002, the Section
insisted that the doctrine "embodies a fluid, fact specific inquiry into the
purpose and effect of numerous different kinds of transactions and events.
Distilling that inquiry into a specific statutory test could rob the doctrine of the
flexibility that gives it strength, or could prove a meaningless exercise."
168
Even if Congress were able to provide objective markers for transactions that
lacked economic substance, a "fact-intensive case-by-case" inquiry would still
be necessary, with the attendant risk that fact-finders would "articulate their
standards and conclusions in varied and perhaps inconsistent ways."'169 A year
later, the Section reaffirmed its conviction that "courts are uniquely well suited
to make the [necessary] determinations and apply the correct standard in the
particular situation before them."'
' 70
The ABA Tax Section was initially more sanguine about the prospects for
codification. According to the Section, a "clarification" would reaffirm the
importance of the doctrine to counter the unsound interpretations of the code on
which tax shelters depended. 171 Under the Section's approach, Congress would
not attempt to define the doctrine or specify when it was relevant-issues that
the Section believed were best left to the courts. Instead, the Section's
"relatively modest" proposal was that, contrary to the advice that certain
practitioners were giving to clients, "Congress confirm that de minimis non-tax
benefits will not sustain a tax motivated transaction."
172
When the more sweeping ambitions of codification proposals became
apparent, however, the Section changed tacks, arguing that the proposed
formulations could not capture the nuances of the doctrine and that, in any case,
no short formulation would work. 173 Echoing the NYSBA Tax Section, the
OF THE CARE ACT OF 2003 (2003) (citing Rice's Toyota World v. Comm'r, 752 F.2d 89 (4th Cir.
1985); Compaq Computer Corp. v. Comm'r, 277 F.3d 779 (5th Cir. 2001) (economic substance satisfied
because taxpayer had "income"); IES Indus., Inc. v. United States, 253 F.3d 350 (8th Cir. 2001)).
168 See N.Y. STATE BAR ASS'N TAX SECTION, REPORT ON TAX SHELTER LEGISLATION,
(2002), Tax Notes Today, 2002 TNT 167-25.
169 Id.
170 See N.Y. STATE BAR ASS'N TAX SECTION, ECONOMIC SUBSTANCE CODIFICATION,
(2003), Tax Notes Today, 2003 TNT 121-26.
171 See Revenue Raising Proposals in the Administration's Fiscal Year 2000 Budget: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on Finance, 106th Cong. para. 36 (1999) (statement of Stefan F. Tucker, Chair,
ABA Tax Section).
172 See Penalty and Interest Provisions in the Internal Revenue Code and Corporate Tax
Shelters: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Finance, 106th Cong., (2000) (statement of Paul J. Sax,
Section of Taxation, American Bar Association), Tax Notes Today, 2000 TNT 48-18 [hereinafter Sax
Statement(B)].
173 See Letter from Herbert N. Belier to Hon. Charles E. Grassley & Hon. Max Baucus supra
note 166, at para. 16-19. The Section emphasized that in requiring both economic substance and
business purpose, the proposals would greatly expand the economic substance doctrine. Id. It also
emphasized that the [new] "reasonable means" requirement of the proposed legislation failed to provide
adequate guidance to distinguish between abusive transactions and legitimate tax planning. Id. at para.
23-30. It argued further that the formulation of profit potential, as "reasonably expected pre-tax profit,"
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ABA Tax Section urged that both the decision of whether the doctrine applies
in the first place and how it should apply in any particular context should be
left to the courts. Codification, it worried, would "encourage the IRS and the
courts to focus too much on vague and subjective considerations rather than
precise questions of statutory interpretation and legislative purpose essential to
the functioning of a statutory system." 174
Over the years, the organized tax bar has engaged in a sustained attack on
codification, which, like its other positions, is difficult to understand in terms of
the short-term interests of lawyers or clients. Tax lawyers will not earn public
relations points from opposing codification, nor are lawyers' financial interests
hurt by codification. To the contrary, a new provision of the tax code with such
broad import would likely increase the demand for lawyers' services. It may be
that clients prefer the uncertainty flowing from judicial doctrines (which they
know) over the uncertainty of a new provision (which they do not know), in
which case the tax bar would be advancing client interests in resisting
codification. But the vehemence of the bar's opposition would seem to be out
of proportion to an apparently weak preference. In any case, it does not make
sense to give weight to client preferences here, when they played no role in the
bar's strong support of other measures to curtail abusive tax shelters.
Given the organized tax bar's support of other initiatives, why has it been
so adamant in resisting codification? In the last Part of this Article, I argue that
the bar's anti-codification stance is a piece of its broader goal to reassert the
authority of traditional tax expertise, which has been eroded by the proliferation
of tax shelters and the textualist approach to interpretation on which those
shelters are based.
III. Reaffirming the Professional Authority of Elite Tax Lawyers
As I have argued, it is implausible to explain the organized tax bar's
support of reform in terms of its members' or clients' financial interests. Had
elite tax lawyers been intent on increasing their or their clients' incomes, they
would have done better to jump into the tax shelter market whole-heartedly and
oppose initiatives to reign it in. Embracing textualism as an approach to tax
interpretation would have provided excellent cover. This approach would have
authorized tax lawyers to provide legal opinions on questionable transaction. It
would also have produced arguments for opposing reforms.
Instead, the organized bar adopted a different route. As I argue in this
Part, the bar's arguments in the tax shelter debate reflect an agenda grounded in
a specific view of professional authority. In its law reform activities, the bar is
seeking to restore the importance of tax expertise based in judicial doctrines.
for purposes of showing that a transaction had economic substance, would be changing the current law.
Id. at para. 31.
174 Id. at para. 13-14.
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These doctrines, and the expertise to which they give rise are premised on the
distinction between legitimate economic activity, which is assumed to be a
social good, and pure tax planning, which is not. In privileging traditional tax
expertise, the bar's initiatives reinforce the role of lawyers to police this
normative boundary and thereby affirm the status of tax lawyers as guardians of
the tax system. Not only do these initiatives empower tax lawyers vis-A-vis
their clients, as suggested above, they also confer power on elite tax lawyers, as
against other tax practitioners, to dictate the substance of tax law expertise in
the shelter context.
A. Courts, Tax Lawyers, and Tax Expertise
The growth of the tax shelter market eroded tax lawyers' professional
authority, which was grounded in their expertise in judicially created doctrines.
In their daily dealings with clients, tax lawyers experienced the downgrading of
their expertise, as clients offered significant financial inducements to procure
opinion letters that legitimated questionable transactions. Clients were not
interested in the substantive advice that tax lawyers had to offer, but sought
opinions only in order to deflect possible penalties. Moreover, as increasing
numbers of tax practitioners became involved in designing, promoting, and
providing letters on abusive transactions, textualist readings of the Code, which
focused on its terms and categories, spread and gained currency. To reassert tax
lawyers' authority, the organized tax bar supported measures that privileged
their expertise in the case law. By the same logic, the bar objected to codifying
the economic substance doctrine because codification risked weakening the
central function of courts to elaborate purposive approaches of interpretation
through cases.
In resisting codification, the tax bar invoked a traditional argument for the
superiority of judicial over other forms of elaborating law. The development of
detailed factual records through adversarial processes allows courts to
scrutinize the specific claims made by taxpayers and the IRS and to assess them
in light of congressional intent. Furthermore, because their decision-making is
incremental, courts have the flexibility to adapt doctrine to changing business
arrangements. Because courts engage in a "fact-sensitive, contextual analysis,"
they are particularly well equipped to articulate the line between legitimate
business arrangements, which further Congress's purpose, and sham
transactions. 175 According to the organized bar, these attributes render courts
particularly well-suited to furthering the fundamental goals of the income tax.
Courts are accordingly the primary locus for the development of tax law.
The bar's support of due diligence requirements, which delegate a
gatekeeping role to tax lawyers, is informed by the bar's view that tax expertise
emanates from courts. Tax lawyers are appropriate gatekeepers because they
175 See N.Y. STATE BAR ASS'N TAX SECTION, supra note 170.
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enjoy in-depth knowledge of cases. This knowledge allows lawyers to
distinguish transactions that have economic substance or business purpose from
those that do not.176 Due diligence obligations thus affirm a particular
understanding of tax law expertise rooted in judicial doctrines, specifically in
the purposive doctrines that have arisen to disallow abusive tax shelters. By
according value to case law expertise, due diligence obligations strengthen elite
tax lawyers' professional authority, not only over clients, who must satisfy their
lawyers that their transactions have a business purpose, but also in relation to
other tax practitioners, who have less facility with purposive modes of
interpretation.
177
The shift to a strict liability regime operates in a similar manner. Like due
diligence, strict liability reinforces the role of tax lawyers as gatekeepers of the
tax system and the importance of case law in fulfilling this role. Under strict
liability, clients considering whether to enter into shelter transactions will seek
out those lawyers who can distinguish tax-favored arrangements that will be
upheld by courts from those that will not; that is to say, those with facility with
business purpose, economic substance, and other relevant doctrines. In creating
a market for a "well reasoned" advice, strict liability affirms the authority of
knowledgeable tax lawyers to dissuade clients from entering into overly
aggressive transactions. It also confers a competitive advantage over
practitioners less expert in the application of judicial doctrines.
At the same time that the organized bar's positions affirm the authority of
judicially-based tax expertise, they also reinforce a normative valuation of
meaningful business activities over pure tax planning. Put differently, the
professional ideology of the tax bar-the account it offers of the role of lawyers
in the tax system-is itself premised on a specific conception of tax law. This
conception accepts as fundamental the goal of taxing income minus the cost of
generating it and the related goal of permitting deductions only for activities
aimed at generating income.
1 78
176 A hallmark tax of law expertise is "to know economic substance when you see it." This
capacity is reinforced by the corporate firm context in which traditional practitioners typically work.
According to one lawyer, general corporate practice confers significant epistemic advantages:
"I enjoy being part of a sort of multi-subject legal practice... I like
going to lunch with the real derivative lawyers at [my firm]. We all meet
together and [talk] about their concerns, which are not tax. It gives me a
sense of more integration with real business transactions and a real
understanding of what I'm working on better."
Rostain, supra note 64, at 1484 (omission and second alteration in original) (quoting
anonymous practitioner).
177 In upgrading the role of expertise, due diligence reveals an important dimension of
lawyers' role in gatekeeping often overlooked in the scholarly literature. In the corporate context,
lawyers are often identified as appropriate gatekeepers because they can withhold assistance that clients
need to carry out questionable transactions. Cf Gilson, supra note 114; Zacharias, supra note 114. Due
diligence requirements in the tax context valorize the exercise of professional expertise.
178 See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
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B. The Distinction Between Business Activities and Pure Tax Planning
Underlying the bar's objection to codification is adherence to a particular
normative account of the tax code, In this account, the tax code privileges
meaningful economic activity, and disfavors tax planning for its own sake. This
distinction drives the bar's preference for courts as decision makers. Courts are
especially well suited to make this distinction, because they can examine
specific transactions in great detail to determine whether they are genuine
business deals or planning devices.
This normative distinction also informs the ABA Tax Section's support of
law reform initiatives that emphasized the economics of transactions. With
regard to taxpayer disclosure obligations, the Section argued that taxpayers
should be required to reveal the underlying nature and economic impact of
shelter transactions. 179 In the same vein, the Section advocated due diligence
requirements because they would require lawyers to ascertain whether
transactions had actual business purpose or economic substance., In each
instance, the challenge was to develop mechanisms that would permit business
enterprise to go forward while deterring tax planning for its own sake.
The same normative orientation is apparent in the NYSBA Tax Section's
approach. In advocating for increased obligations for taxpayers and their
lawyers, the Section was indifferent to the risk that these reforms would deter
legitimate tax planning. As the Section recognized, the measures it favored
would discourage transactions that might well be upheld by courts under
current law.181 The Section was not particularly troubled by this result. It noted
that tax policy has to take into account the "inherent imperfections" of the tax
system. From this perspective, transactions that are motivated solely or
primarily by tax avoidance represent an inefficient use of resources and are
therefore appropriately deterred.1
82
Contrast the position of the AICPA. Consistent with its textualist
approach to interpreting tax law, that organization deployed a rhetoric that
treats tax planning as a legal entitlement. Throughout the tax shelter debate, it
underscored the "right" of taxpayers to engage in tax minimization for its own
sake. For example, in opposing strengthened disclosure requirements, the
association emphasized that "it supports and defends the right of taxpayers to
arrange their affairs to minimize the taxes they must fairly pay."' 3 According
179 See supra notes 104-105 and accompanying text.
180 See supra notes 116-118 and accompanying text.
181 See NYSBA 1999A COMMENTS, supra note 24, at 885, 896.
182 Id. at 885; Rostain, supra note 64 at 1488. As one tax lawyer stated in explaining his law
reform activities: "'The fact that as a lawyer you can come to the conclusion that... [an aggressive tax
planning transaction] works doesn't mean that it's a good thing that as a pattern that people are entering
into [these] transactions."' Id. (quoting practitioner anonymously interviewed by author).
183 See Revenue Provisions in President's Fiscal Year 2000 Budget: Hearing Before the
Senate Finance Comm, supra note 107, at para. 76.
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to the AICPA, a corollary of this right is that taxpayers are entitled to have a
clear demarcation between abusive tax shelters and legitimate transactions
written into law. This was the basis for its opposition to increased penalties:
"Extraordinary sanctions [sanctions above 20%] should not apply in areas that
are difficult to distinguish from the normal exercise of a taxpayer's right to
keep taxes at a legitimate minimum level.' 84 In the same vein, although the
accounting organization has recognized a place for the business purpose
doctrine, it has argued for a narrow, clearly delineated reading of its
requirements.1
85
Whereas the organized accounting profession treats tax law as a series of
rules that sharply delineate the realms of illegal tax evasion and permitted tax
avoidance, the organized tax bar's proposals suggest a different conception. In
the tax bar's view, no set of specific rules is sufficient given the varying and
sometimes conflicting goals of the Code. A wily taxpayer will always find a
way of avoiding taxes via tax-favored transactions. According to the bar, if
Congress's basic aim to tax income and provide deductions solely for income
generating activities is to be realized, tax rules need to be supplemented with a
set of flexible, fact-specific doctrines
In arguing for flexible doctrines over bright-line rules, tax lawyers are not
only insisting on a normative line between meaningful business activity and
pure tax planning, they are also affirming their claim to be gatekeepers of the
tax system. They assert this claim in two different arenas. In the public debate
on law reform, the tax bar's arguments reinforce the view that the positions of
the bar should be accorded deference because tax lawyers have an in-depth
understanding of the goals and imperfections of the tax code. In their
representation of private clients, tax lawyers can invoke their expertise in the
application of judicial doctrines to advise clients as to which transactions are
legitimate and which are not.
In contrast, the accounting profession's preference for bright line rules fits
with accountants' emphasis on tax minimization. Such rules permit the
delineation of limited spheres of proscribed activity outside of which all
activities are permitted. This view is of a piece with the claim that taxpayers
have a "right" to minimize their taxes and that accountants should help
184 Id. at para. 3; see also Letter from Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accts to Hon. Charles 0.
Rossotti para. 61 (Apr. 27, 2001), Tax Notes Today, 2001 TNT 82-34 (asserting "fundamental principle
that sanctions should be imposed only on failures to meet clearly ascertainable minimum standards").
185 According to the AICPA, abusive transactions are those that have "no business purpose
other than tax avoidance." Letter from Barry C. Melancon, President & C.E.O., Am. Inst. of Certified
Pub. Accts., & Robert A. Zarzar, Chair, Tax Executive Comm., Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accts., to
members of the Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accts. para. 10 (Mar. 24, 2003), Tax Notes Today, 2003
TNT 59-62. To establish business purpose, it would be sufficient for a taxpayer to show that it had a
"reasonable expectation of making a reasonable pre-tax profit"-a condition easily satisfied by
incorporating into a transaction assets with a predictable rate of return--or that the transaction "was
clearly relevant to the conduct of a taxpayer's business." Id at Q1-Al; see also Q2-A2 (broad definition
under current law "highly troubling" and "of great concern").
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taxpayers to realize that right. Nowhere does the organized accounting
profession evidence a concern that if every taxpayer were successful in
asserting the "right to minimize taxes," no taxes would be paid.
C. Ideological Stakes
If the organized tax bar is not directly seeking to further tax lawyers' or
clients' financial interests, what are the interests advanced by their positions?
To address this question, it is useful to invoke Pierre Bourdieu's account of a
"field." The concept of a field highlights the relational dimensions of social
life. 86 In a legal field, actors and institutions compete "for monopoly of the
right to determine the law."'
' 87
Following a Bourdieuian approach, tax law is a field in which tax
practitioners vie over the authority to dictate the substance of tax law expertise.
The proliferation of tax shelters threatened the authority of tax expertise framed
around purposive modes of interpretation.' 88 Economic incentives created by
the regulatory regime in force undermined the value of traditional expertise.
Textualism, which legitimized abusive transactions, gained credence as the
importance of judicially based doctrines declined.
Through their organized bar activities, elite lawyers argued for initiatives
that would reaffirm the primacy of judicially created doctrines. In so doing,
they upgraded the value of their own expertise. On one level, the tax bar's
initiatives can be viewed as maneuvers to suppress competition from other tax
practitioners-the "tax shelter" bar-which had gained market power by
designing, promoting and providing opinions that legitimated abusive tax
shelters. In the competition over the field of tax, elite tax lawyers have
reasserted their authority, in the face of competition from proponents of
textualism, to define the terms in which the field is constituted. In so doing,
they have also reclaimed the economic advantages of possessing traditional
expertise and diluted the benefits of textualist approaches.
On a deeper level, the organized bar's initiatives can also be read as an
attempt by its own members to rein themselves in. As the market for tax
shelters expanded, the path of least resistance was to participate. In the confines
186 See PIERRE BOURDIEU & LOIC J.D. WACQUANT, supra note 15, at 96-98. "In highly
differentiated societies, the social cosmos is made up of a number of such relatively autonomous social
microcosms, i.e., spaces of objective relations that are the site of a logic and a necessity that are specific
and irreducible to those that regulate other fields." Id. at 97.
187 See Pierre Bourdieu & Richard Terdiman, The Force of Law: Toward a Sociology of the
Juridical Field, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 805, 817 (1987). In proposing to understand law as a field, Bourdieu
seeks to avoid succumbing, on the one hand, to a formalist conception of law, in which it develops
independently through an internal dynamic, and on the other, an instrumental conception of law, which
treats law as the reflection of the interests of dominant groups. Id. at 814-16; see also ANDREW
ABBOTT, THE SYSTEM OF PROFESSIONS (1988) (professions compete over the boundaries of"knowledge
jurisdictions" in which they control the terms in which problems are framed and solved).
188 See, e.g., Bankman, supra note 50, at 153-54.
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of their private offices, tax lawyers felt intense pressure to provide clients with
opinions on questionable transactions. The activities of the organized bar
offered a space for the same lawyers collectively to resist these pressures. In the
law reform arena, tax lawyers could support initiatives that strengthened their
capacity to resist. On this view, the tax bar's initiatives were a Ulyssean
strategy: Tax lawyers tied their own hands, so they could resist the siren song
of the tax shelter business.
The organized tax bar's reforms bestow power on elite tax lawyers in their
relationships with their clients and in the market for tax advice. To legitimate
the power of tax lawyers-to couch it in terms of professional authority-the
bar has had to anchor its claims in the normative distinction between genuine
business activities and tax planning for its own sake. Thus, to assert the value
of its own expertise, the tax bar has affirmed the normative framework that
underlies the income tax. Put differently, the long-term economic and
reputational benefits that flow from the bar's reforms help keep tax lawyers in
alignment with the underlying purposes served by the tax system. By pursuing
initiatives that affirm their status as gatekeepers, tax lawyers end up doing well
and doing good at the same time.'
89
IV. Conclusion: Sheltering Lawyers
The end of the twentieth century saw the rise of a substantial market in
abusive corporate tax shelters. Big accounting firms, historically predisposed to
tax textualism through their return preparation services, took advantage of their
size, organization, and tax expertise to launch a highly lucrative industry in
standardized tax minimization strategies. Investment banks, law firms, and
second-tier accounting firms followed their lead. Individual tax lawyers, drawn
by financial incentives, were soon deeply implicated in all aspects of the tax
shelter industry.
While individual lawyers were under strong market incentives to
participate in tax shelters, the organized tax bar itself responded by supporting
law reform initiatives directed at curbing the market. The organized tax bar's
positions illustrate the ambivalent relationship that professional projects can
have to the market. Professional ideologies are typically antagonistic to a
purely business orientation and at odds with immediate economic interests. But
by strengthening the authority of expertise, professional ideologies may also
increase the demand for professional services. In the case of tax practice, the
bar's reforms reinforce tax lawyers' professional power by aligning the
lawyers' interests with the goals of the tax system.
Many factors undoubtedly influence the extent to which lawyers ascribe to
professional ideologies that, while affirming the lawyers' authority, require
189 See generally FREIDSON, supra note 18, at 197-222 (discussing the "soul" of
professionalism").
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them to forego short-term economic benefits. At the most fundamental level,
though, lawyers participate in law reform insofar as they construct a
professional identity around being lawyers, as opposed to consultants or legal
information specialists. This consideration suggests the necessity of attending
more broadly to the institutions that shape professional ideology, including
professional associations, law schools, and perhaps most important, the
organizations in which lawyers work. The evidence provided by the activities
of accounting firms in the tax shelter industry and of lawyers at these firms
suggests that lawyers working in such an environment may be less inclined to
view themselves as lawyers with obligations to the legal system.' ° On the
other side, the depth of investment by lawyers from corporate firms in the tax
bar's reform efforts suggests that practice in traditional firms, organized around
serving individual clients' legal needs, may reflect and reinforce professional
commitments, including participation in law reform activities.191
190 It is not clear how strongly lawyers who work in accounting firms identify with the legal
profession. For example, in an apparent effort to avoid the charge that they are engaged in an
impermissible multidisciplinary practice, tax lawyers who joined accounting firms during the shelter
heyday insisted that they did not practice law but, like their accounting counterparts, practiced "tax." See
John Gibeaut, Squeeze Play, A.B.A. J. 42, 44 (Feb. 1998); Lanning, supra note 63.
191 See Deborah L Rhode, Ethical Perspectives in Law Practice, 37 STAN L. REV. 589 (1985);
Tanina Rostain, Waking up from Uneasy Dreams: Professional Context, Discretionary Judgment, and
The Practice of Justice, 51 STAN. L. REV. 955 (1999). As David Luban has noted, this point was
overlooked in the bar's debate about multidisciplinary practices. See David Luban, Asking the Right
Questions, 72 TEMP. L. REV. 839 (1999). Another important site is law school. I have previously
expressed skepticism about how significant a role legal education can play in shaping lawyers'
normative commitments, given the powerful socializing effects of practice. See Rostain, supra, at 969-
70. Nonetheless, the legal academy has an important function in articulating and defending the
normative aspirations of the legal profession in the classroom and in scholarship. See DEBORAH L.
RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE 185-206 (2000).
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